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ABSTRACT
The common law doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as
collateral estoppel, prevents parties from relitigating an issue in
subsequent lawsuits if a prior judgment already conclusively decided
the issue. Issue preclusion traditionally required strict mutuality of
parties; the first and second lawsuits had to involve the exact same
litigants. Although the majority of jurisdictions now allow nonmutual
issue preclusion, Georgia continues to enforce “identity of parties”
as a necessary element of issue preclusion. Despite recently
reaffirming this requirement, the Georgia Supreme Court has not
thoroughly analyzed the merits of the rule.
This Note examines the evolution of issue preclusion and the
mutuality element in federal and state courts, distinguishes offensive
and defensive assertions of issue preclusion, contrasts Georgia with
other jurisdictions, considers policy arguments, and explores why the
Georgia Supreme Court has not addressed the nationwide trend
towards allowing nonmutual issue preclusion. The Note argues for
changing Georgia law to allow nonmutual issue preclusion in civil
litigation and advises practitioners on practical avenues for
achieving that goal.
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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers and politicians often argue that someone who had a
chance to formally prove or disprove something should not receive
“another bite at the apple.”1 The common law principle of issue
preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel,2 turns that maxim into
a procedural rule.3 Issue preclusion in civil cases “bars parties from
relitigating issues of either fact or law that were adjudicated in an
earlier proceeding.”4 Practically, this doctrine means that if a court
decided an issue in one lawsuit, then parties in a second lawsuit do
not need to relitigate the same issue.5 Issue preclusion, unlike claim
preclusion, is not necessarily case-dispositive but rather narrows the
scope of the second suit by removing an issue from consideration. 6
1. Second
Bite
of
the
Apple,
THE
FREE
DICTIONARY,
https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/second+bite+of+the+apple
[https://perma.cc/A98Y-7YJS]
(defining “second bite of the apple” as “a second chance or opportunity”). See generally Mark
DeBofsky, Court Gives Insurer Another Bite at the Apple, DEBOFSKY (July 6, 2013),
https://www.debofsky.com/articles/court-gives-insurer-another-bite-at-the-apple/
[https://perma.cc/59EG-CHW9]. At least one Georgia court also noted the policy disfavoring repeated
chances when it held against allowing a statute of limitations exception because a party “chose not to
present any evidence . . . and it is not entitled to another bite at the apple.” Desalvo v. State, 683 S.E.2d
652, 653 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted).
2. For the purposes of this Note, the author will generally use the more modern term “issue
preclusion,” except when quoting directly from case law. Notably, however, courts may also use the
term “res judicata” to refer to both issue preclusion and claim preclusion. See, e.g., Lucky Brand
Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., No. 18-1086, slip op. at 6 (U.S. May 14, 2020). The U.S.
Supreme Court explained the various terminologies by first clarifying that res judicata “now comprises
two distinct doctrines regarding the preclusive effect of prior litigation.” Id. These two doctrines are
“issue preclusion (sometimes called collateral estoppel)” and “claim preclusion (sometimes itself called
res judicata).” Id.
3. See generally 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4416 (3d ed. 2020).
4. Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. United States, 850 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2017); see also Lucky
Brand Dungarees, slip op. at 6 (“[I]ssue preclusion (sometimes called collateral estoppel), . . . precludes
a party from relitigating an issue actually decided in a prior case and necessary to the judgment.”).
Application of issue preclusion in criminal cases falls beyond the scope of this Note.
5. RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 571 (3d ed. 2012).
6. Id. One scholar provides a useful example of how issue preclusion works and how it is not
case-dispositive:
[S]uppose in the car accident involving Petra and Don that Petra had a passenger
Paul. If Petra sues Don, and Don is found at fault in causing the accident in Petra’s
lawsuit, then collateral estoppel will prevent Don from relitigating the issue of fault
when Paul sues him, even though Paul’s legal claim is different from Petra’s. Paul
will, of course, still have to prove causation for his own injuries as well as damages.
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Procedurally, a litigant may raise issue preclusion in a motion for
summary judgment, another pleading, or in some circumstances, in a
motion to dismiss.7
Traditionally, issue preclusion only applied if the first lawsuit and
the second lawsuit both involved the same parties (or their privies) as
direct adversaries to prevent parties from relitigating the same issue
against one another over and over again. 8 However, federal courts
and the majority of states have disavowed this strict mutuality
standard and now allow a new litigant—a stranger to the prior
action—to assert issue preclusion in the second lawsuit against an
adversary that was a party to the first lawsuit. 9 Under this modern
Michael H. Hoffheimer, Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel in Mississippi, 88 MISS. L.J. 521, 529 (2020).
7. 18 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 132.05 (3d ed. 2020). Issue
preclusion is typically treated as an affirmative defense for purposes of burden of proof—the party
raising issue preclusion must prove it, typically, by introducing the record of prior judgment. Id.
Regardless of the procedural vehicle, the movant should raise issue preclusion before trial. Id. Like other
affirmative defenses, a party may inadvertently waive the right to assert issue preclusion if the party
does not raise it at the trial court level. Id.
8. Id. § 51:261 (issue preclusion may be asserted “if the party asserting issue preclusion was a party
or in privity with a party to the prior action, such that it would have been bound had the earlier litigation
reached the opposite result”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. L. INST.
1982) (stating that issue preclusion applies “where the second action is between the same persons who
were parties to the prior action, and who were adversaries”). Privity refers to when two persons or
entities are closely aligned with regard to the relevant matters such that a judgment against one binds the
other. FREER, supra note 3, at 608. Privies are essentially regarded as the same party for the purposes of
the litigation; allowing privies to an original litigant to assert issue preclusion does not violate strict
mutuality. Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 950 (1988)
(“With a mutuality requirement, issue preclusion applies only between parties, or those in privity with
parties, to the initial lawsuit.” (emphasis added)). A privity analysis implicates constitutional due
process concerns of whether preclusion may be asserted against someone who was not technically a
party to the first lawsuit. FREER, supra note 5, at 606–17. In contrast, a mutuality analysis involves
asking “[b]y (not against) whom can [issue] preclusion be asserted,” and that question does not raise due
process issues. Id. at 617. The U.S. Supreme Court in Taylor v. Sturgell laid out the requirements for
privity, also known as “nonparty preclusion” in this context, and listed six categories of privies. See 553
U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008). Georgia law is less clear on the privity issue and may analyze it on a
case-by-case basis. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549, 552 (Ga. 2006)
(‘“[T]here is no definition of “privity” which can be automatically applied to all cases involving the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel,’ . . . since ‘privity depends upon the
circumstances.’ . . . ‘Privity may . . . be established if the party to the first suit represented the interests
of the party to the second suit.’” (quoting Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, 7 F.3d 1464, 1468–69 (10th
Cir. 1993))); see also ALR Oglethorpe, LLC v. Henderson, 783 S.E.2d 187, 192 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016);
Dalton Paving & Constr., Inc. v. S. Green Constr. of Ga., Inc., 643 S.E.2d 754, 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007);
Bennett v. Cotton, 536 S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Olson v. Harveston, 276 S.E.2d 54, 65
(Ga. Ct. App. 1981).
9. FREER, supra note 5, at 618–31.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss2/8

4

Gautier: Reluctance Or Apathy?

2021]

RELUCTANCE OR APATHY?

545

trend, a new defendant can use issue preclusion against a party to the
first lawsuit (nonmutual defensive issue preclusion), and in some
jurisdictions, a new plaintiff can also use issue preclusion against a
party to the first lawsuit (nonmutual offensive issue preclusion). 10 In
all cases, parties can only use issue preclusion against someone who
was a party to the first lawsuit because of due process concerns. 11
Thus, the key question in application of mutuality doctrines is “[b]y
(not against) whom can [issue] preclusion be asserted?”12 A court’s
analysis will depend on whether a defendant or a plaintiff asserts
issue preclusion.13
Although most states have followed the modern trend towards
abandoning strict mutuality and at least allowing nonmutual
defensive issue preclusion, the Georgia Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue.14 Despite a clear plea following a thorough
analysis by the Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme
Court declined to consider whether Georgia should join the vast
majority of states and allow nonmutual defensive issue preclusion. 15
In Georgia, “collateral estoppel requires the identity of the parties or
their privies in both actions.”16 In other words, Georgia is part of a
10. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc.
v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320–23 (1971); Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F. Supp. 2d 391, 399
(E.D. Pa. 2002).
11. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464 (“[C]ourts have adopted a rule that nonmutual issue
preclusion is permitted unless it would be unfair. This fairness limitation does not apply to nonparties
who would have been bound by the prior judgment . . . .”); see also, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90, 95 (1980) (“But one general limitation the Court has repeatedly recognized is that the concept of
collateral estoppel cannot apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not
have a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate that issue in the earlier case.” (quoting Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979))).
12. FREER, supra note 5, at 617 (emphasis omitted).
13. Id.
14. See infra Section II.C.
15. See generally Wickliffe v. Wickliffe Co. (Wickliffe I), 489 S.E.2d 153 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997), cert.
denied, No. S97C1859, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 185 (Ga. Jan. 5, 1998).
16. Waldroup v. Greene Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 463 S.E.2d 5, 5–8 (Ga. 1995); see also Sure, Inc. v.
Premier Petroleum, Inc., 807 S.E.2d 19, 25 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (“The doctrine of collateral estoppel,
also known as issue preclusion, prevents the re-litigation of an issue actually litigated and adjudicated on
the merits between the same parties or their privies.” (quoting York v. RES-GA LJY, LLC, 799 S.E.2d
235, 241 (Ga. 2017))). Georgia courts tend to use the term “collateral estoppel” rather than “issue
preclusion.” See, e.g., Waldroup, 463 S.E.2d at 6; Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God, Inc. v.
Brinson, 696 S.E.2d 667, 668–69 (Ga. 2010). Georgia courts also often confuse and intertwine the use
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slimming minority of jurisdictions that still require strict mutuality of
parties or their privies for issue preclusion to bar or merge an issue in
a second lawsuit.17
Determining the proper scope of mutuality is not merely an
academic exercise. 18 Preclusion law also implicates economic
concerns for both individuals and industry. 19 For instance, if multiple
corporate defendants must each separately litigate the same issue of
liability for the same plaintiff’s alleged injury, then they will need to
expend resources to cover these duplicative litigation costs.20 In
contrast, under a nonmutual defensive preclusion regime, if a jury
finds the plaintiff caused her own injuries, then each subsequent
defendant can rely on that judgment and preclude the causation issue
from relitigation at the second trial—potentially saving the
company-defendant thousands of dollars in expenses such as the
costs of experts, depositions, and attorney’s fees.21 Given Georgia’s
of the terms “collateral estoppel” and “res judicata” and the distinct elements of each doctrine. See, e.g.,
Waggaman v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 458 S.E.2d 826, 827 (Ga. 1995) (applying an issue preclusion
analysis but referring to it as “res judicata” throughout the opinion); see also, e.g., ALR Oglethorpe,
LLC v. Henderson, 783 S.E.2d 187, 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (“The law of res judicata and collateral
estoppel is somewhat confusing, primarily due to our failure to clearly and consistently distinguish the
two separate doctrines.”). The U.S. Supreme Court defined the term res judicata as encompassing both
claim and issue preclusion. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (“The preclusive effect of a
judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as ‘res
judicata.’”). However, most hornbooks, black letter law treatises, and law school civil procedure
casebooks separate the concepts and list res judicata as synonymous with claim preclusion and collateral
estoppel as synonymous with issue preclusion. See, e.g., A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 1017–56 (5th ed. 2018).
17. See E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Mutuality of Estoppel As Prerequisite of Availability of Doctrine
of Collateral Estoppel to a Stranger to the Judgment, 31 A.L.R.3d 1044, § 3(a) (1970).
18. See generally Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992); Peter H. Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous
Litigation Games, 23 REV. LITIG. 47 (2004); Daniel Klerman, The Economics of Civil Procedure, 11
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 353 (2015).
19. See generally Bone, supra note 18; Huang, supra note 18; Klerman, supra note 18.
20. Costs in Civil Lawsuits, LAWYERS.COM, https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/research/courtcosts-in-civil-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/F9GF-CV7C] (Apr. 9, 2015). Unlike other countries,
courts in the United States generally follow the aptly named “American Rule.” John F. Vargo, The
American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1567, 1569 (1993). Under this rule, each litigant must pay his own legal fees regardless of the outcome
of litigation. Id. In contrast, the “English Rule” allows a successful plaintiff to shift the cost of his
attorney’s fees to the losing defendant. Id.
21. MOORE ET AL., supra note 7, § 132.01 ¶ 3 (recognizing that issue preclusion “relieves parties of
the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, prevents inconsistent decisions, encourages reliance on
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growing economy and current policy directives favoring business
development, the economic reasons for abandoning mutuality are
especially relevant to the state. 22 By furthering the policies of
predictability, finality, repose, and efficiency, nonmutual defensive
issue preclusion promotes economic growth while still protecting due
process and an injured plaintiff’s first “bite of the apple.”23
This Note examines the implications of Georgia’s continuing use
of this strict mutuality standard in civil suits. Part I of the Note
provides background into the history of common law issue preclusion
and the trend towards nonmutual defensive and nonmutual offensive
applications in federal courts and other states, as well as the current
status of Georgia law. Part II provides a discussion of policy reasons
in favor of and in opposition to changing the mutuality standard,
further analysis of Georgia law compared with other jurisdictions,
and an examination of prior attempts by practitioners to raise the
matter to the Georgia Supreme Court. Part III discusses why Georgia
should adopt a nonmutual defensive issue preclusion standard and the
best practical avenues to achieve that goal.
I. BACKGROUND
In addition to some form of mutuality or limited nonmutuality, the
black letter law elements of issue preclusion include: (1) both actions
involved an identical issue; (2) the issue was actually litigated and
decided in the first action; (3) the parties in the first action had a full

adjudication by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions, and conserves judicial resources”);
see also Costs in Civil Lawsuits, supra note 20 (noting that litigation expenses can include filing fees
and witness fees).
22. Pro-Business Environment, GA. DEP’T OF ECON. DEV., https://www.georgia.org/competitiveadvantages/pro-business-environment [https://perma.cc/PAU4-G3DA]. Georgia has been named the
number one state for business by multiple publications. Id. Georgia’s current policy incentives to attract
new businesses include low taxes, tax credits, and investment in infrastructure. Id. Georgia aims to
attract Fortune 500 companies to the state through “favorable business conditions.” Id.
23. Bone, supra note 18, at 229 (listing “judicial economy, repose, and decisional consistency” as
policy reasons for issue preclusion); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, Offensive Non-Mutual Issue
Preclusion Revisited, 38 REV. LITIG. 281, 287–88 (2019) (defending nonmutual defensive issue
preclusion because “a litigant is entitled to one bite—and only one bite—of the apple”).
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and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the first action was
adjudicated as a valid final judgment on the merits. 24 Because of due
process concerns, issue preclusion can only ever be asserted against a
party to the first action; the Constitution affords each party its day in
court.25 Thus, if a party did not have an opportunity to litigate the
issue, preclusion doctrines do not apply. 26 Mutuality—the final
element of issue preclusion and the subject of this Note—involves
which parties may assert issue preclusion. 27
The mutuality element of issue preclusion has three general
variations: strict mutuality, nonmutual defensive, and nonmutual
offensive.28 Historically, courts applied the strict mutuality standard
(sometimes itself called “mutuality”), which requires that issue
preclusion only be asserted by a litigant who was a party to the first
case.29 Nonmutual preclusion refers to scenarios where the party
asserting issue preclusion in the second case was not a party to the
24. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3. In contrast, “claim preclusion prevents parties from raising
issues that could have been raised and decided in a prior action—even if they were not actually
litigated.” Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., No. 18-1086, slip op. at 6 (U.S.
May 14, 2020).
25. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (recognizing that issue preclusion rules should
comply with the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court”
(quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4449)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Despite this
apparent constitutional protection, some commentators suggest that courts should expand issue
preclusion and allow litigants to assert it even against some nonparties in cases when “the nonparty sues
about the same set of events, asserts the same legal theories, seeks the same remedies, or shares the
same interests in the outcome of the litigation as the plaintiff to the first suit” or when “the nonparty and
the original plaintiff retain the same attorney or . . . the nonparty testified at the original trial.” Bone,
supra note 18, at 196.
26. See generally Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). The Taylor court also recognized
exceptions to this rule—circumstances where issue preclusion could be used against someone who was
not a party to the first lawsuit. Id. “In a class action, for example, a person not named as a party may be
bound by a judgment on the merits of the action, if she was adequately represented by a party who
actively participated in the litigation.” Id. at 884. The major exception, in federal courts and state courts,
is when a nonparty was in privity with a party to the first suit. See infra Section II.B, for further
discussion of this privity exception and how it is distinct from the mutuality requirement.
27. Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 296–97.
28. See Erichson, supra note 8, at 965–68.
29. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464 (“The traditional mutuality rule denied the benefits of
preclusion to any nonparty who would not have been subject to the burdens of preclusion, but with
gradually expanding exceptions for vicarious liability relationships. This traditional rule has been
abandoned as to issue preclusion by federal courts and a continually increasing majority of state
courts.”); see also, e.g., Fisher v. Jones, 844 S.W.2d 954, 958 (Ark. 1993) (“[T]he requirement of
mutuality has been abandoned by most jurisdictions for collateral estoppel.”).
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first case.30 Nonmutual defensive means that the defendant in the
second case asserts issue preclusion.31 In contrast, nonmutual
offensive refers to the second-case plaintiff asserting issue
preclusion.32 Although virtually all American courts permit strictly
mutual assertions of issue preclusion, whether a nonmutual litigant
may assert issue preclusion varies by jurisdiction. 33
A. Federal Law
The U.S. Supreme Court disavowed the strict mutuality standard in
favor of allowing nonmutual defensive preclusion in the 1971
seminal civil procedure case of Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation.34 The Court reaffirmed the
abandonment of strict mutuality in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore
and further extended the doctrine of issue preclusion to allow for
nonmutual offensive issue preclusion in cases where its application
meets certain fairness factors.35 Thus, under current federal
jurisprudence, assuming the other elements are met, a new defendant,
and in some cases a new plaintiff, to the second lawsuit may use
issue preclusion to bar an issue from being relitigated against a party
in the first lawsuit.36

30. See generally Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971);
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
31. See generally Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. 313; Parklane, 439 U.S. 322.
32. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464.
33. Id.
34. 402 U.S. 313.
35. 439 U.S. at 331–33. The fairness factors are: (1) whether the defendant had similar incentive to
vigorously defend and litigate the first lawsuit, including whether the defendants could foresee
subsequent lawsuits; (2) whether courts have resolved the issue differently, leading to inconsistent prior
judgments; and (3) whether there are different or new procedures in the second suit that could cause a
different result. Id. The Court concluded that the Parklane plaintiffs could use estoppel offensively
because, in light of the seriousness of the allegations, the defendants had similar incentive to litigate the
first action, no other courts had ruled inconsistently with the resolution of the issue in the first action,
and defendants could not use any new procedures in the second action. Id.
36. See, e.g., id.; Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. 313.
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1. The Evolution of Federal Law
Before 1971, controlling federal court precedent generally required
strict mutuality.37 However, lower courts increasingly found ways to
distinguish precedent and allow nonmutual defensive preclusion. 38
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit first affirmed
defensive preclusion in 1950 when it held that a ship worker suing
the United States for personal injuries under a negligence theory
could not proceed to trial because the ship company and its crew
were found not to be negligent for the same injuries in the worker’s
prior lawsuit.39 Although the court arguably limited its holding to
cases where respondeat superior would apply—the plaintiff was now
asserting that the United States, not the ship company, was the
principal—the majority opinion noted that “the countervailing
consideration” was “lack of mutuality of estoppel.”40 The court noted
37. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 93 illus. 10 (AM. L. INST. 1942) (“A brings an
action against B for infringement of a patent. B defends on the ground that the alleged patent was void
and obtains judgment. A brings an action for infringement of the same patent against C who seeks to
interpose the judgment in favor of B as res judicata, but set[s] up no relation with B. On demurrer,
judgment should be for A.”); see also Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 642 (1936). See generally
Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912) (recognizing “a
principle of general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual”).
38. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 114 F.2d 582, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (“Our
previous decisions are not technically res judicata as between appellant and appellee, since the latter was
not a party to any of the prior proceedings. But those determinations are conclusive against appellant,
unless we are now to repudiate what we have done repeatedly and consistently whenever the issues
involved in them have been raised.”). Although the court in Fletcher used the oft-confused terminology
of res judicata instead of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, the court used a disbarment ruling, to
which the defendant newspaper was not a party, to bar relitigation of whether the plaintiff was actually
disbarred for purposes of his libel claim. Id.; see also Smith v. Hood, 396 F.2d 692, 693 (D.C. Cir.
1968). Although the court in Smith ultimately upheld the mutuality requirement as applied to the facts
before it, it noted that “the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be in flux, with a trend towards barring
relitigation of an issue by a one-time loser.” Id. Courts also recognized an exception to the mutuality
rule when the first lawsuit was a class action and the litigant asserting issue preclusion in the second
action was not a party to the class action but was a member of the class. Id.
39. See generally Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950). Although the court in
Bruszewski used the term “res judicata” throughout the opinion, the opinion made clear that the primary
dispute involved whether the issue of negligence had already been decided. Id. In this case, the issue of
negligence was case-dispositive, so issue preclusion and claim preclusion would have led to the same
result. Id. Furthermore, the court consistently referred to “mutuality of estoppel” as its primary
consideration. Id.
40. Id. at 421 (“The countervailing consideration urged here is lack of mutuality of estoppel.”). The
court could have reached the same conclusion under a privity analysis by finding that the United States
and the ship company in the first lawsuit were in privity and there was mutuality, but the court
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“the achievement of substantial justice rather than symmetry is the
measure of the fairness” in preclusion cases, and that its holding
supported “both orderliness and reasonable time saving in judicial
administration.”41
The Blonder-Tongue Court in 1971 seemed particularly persuaded
by similar policy considerations in deciding whether a plaintiff could
bring successive lawsuits for the same alleged wrong.42 The Court
noted the increasingly crowded dockets and the need for judicial
efficiency.43 Litigants should have incentives to assert and defend all
of their claims at the first opportunity to avoid “the aura of the
gaming table” that occurs when plaintiffs have numerous defendants
against whom they could test different strategies and hope for more
favorable outcomes.44 The Court also considered the external
consequences of requiring strict mutuality and found changing the
rule would make economic sense. 45 A nonmutual defensive standard
lowers overall litigation costs, presumably resulting in defendants
commented that the two defendants may have been “beyond any definable categories of privity.” Id. The
concurring opinion would have explicitly narrowed the holding to apply only when the defendants in the
first case and the second case were “sufficiently close.” Id. at 423 (Goodrich, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 421. In a preview of the later U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the Bruszewski court
emphasized that its decision did not result in any unfairness to the plaintiff. Id. The court dismissed
arguments that allowing a lack of mutuality would make the law “asymmetrical.” Id.
42. Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971).
43. Id. The Court noted:
[Other cases and authorities] connect erosion of the mutuality requirement to the goal
of limiting relitigation of issues where that can be achieved without compromising
fairness in particular cases. The courts have often discarded the rule while
commenting on crowded dockets and long delays preceding trial. Authorities differ
on whether the public interest in efficient judicial administration is a sufficient
ground in and of itself for abandoning mutuality, but it is clear that more than
crowded dockets is involved. . . . To the extent the defendant in the second suit may
not win by asserting, without contradiction, that the plaintiff had fully and fairly, but
unsuccessfully, litigated the same claim in the prior suit, the defendant’s time and
money are diverted from alternative uses—productive or otherwise—to relitigation of
a decided issue.
Id.
44. Id. at 329 (“Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated
defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table or [problems with the lower courts].”).
45. Id. at 346–47. Again, the Court’s analysis focused on the economic consequences of strict
mutuality of patent cases. Id. However, the reasons the Court discussed in support of its conclusion—
namely, the potential added costs to litigants to defend the same issues multiple times—can be
extrapolated to apply to all lawsuits. See infra Part II.
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allocating resources to other investments or projects instead.46 The
Court balanced those considerations with the traditionally understood
arguments in favor of mutuality: fairness to litigants and due
process.47 The Court ultimately overruled precedent and held that
civil defendants may assert issue preclusion without the mutuality
requirement—with the important caveat and “safeguard” that the
party against whom issue preclusion is asserted “had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate.”48
Because the underlying lawsuit in Blonder-Tongue involved
patents, the Court primarily analyzed the policy considerations in the
context of patent suits, but the same broad arguments apply to any
assertion of nonmutual issue preclusion. 49 In fact, although the
expressed holding from Blonder-Tongue arguably only applied to
patent infringement cases, federal courts generally applied the rule
broadly and allowed nonmutual defensive issue preclusion in
non-patent-related lawsuits as well. 50 Lower courts cited
Blonder-Tongue as a green light from the U.S. Supreme Court to
abandon the mutuality doctrine altogether; its application was not
limited to patent cases.51 Within the federal court system, the Third

46. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329 (“To the extent the defendant in the second suit may not win
by asserting [issue preclusion], the defendant’s time and money are diverted from alternative uses—
productive or otherwise—to relitigation of a decided issue.”).
47. Id. at 328.
48. Id. at 329 (“[T]he requirement of determining whether the party against whom an estoppel is
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate is a most significant safeguard.”); id. at 349–50
(“Thus, we conclude that [precedent] should be overruled to the extent it forecloses a plea of estoppel by
one facing a charge of infringement of a patent that has once been declared invalid.”).
49. Id. at 328.
50. Id. at 349–50; see also, e.g., Cardillo v. Zyla, 486 F.2d 473, 475 (1st Cir. 1973) (“Mutuality of
estoppel, once a requirement before there could be a preclusion of an issue by judgment, is no longer
normally required.” (citing Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. 313)); Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th
Cir. 1975) (“Under traditional collateral estoppel theory, the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel required
that the party asserting the defense must have been a party to the earlier litigation. In [Blonder-Tongue],
the Supreme Court criticized and rejected the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel. Thus, [the defendants]
may assert the defense.”). But see Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 771 (3d Cir. 1974) (“[I]t
is at least questionable that the Blonder-Tongue case mandates a re-tailoring of estoppel law in
non-patent cases . . . .”). The Court resolved this circuit split only a few years later in Parklane. See
generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
51. See, e.g., Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 844 (3d Cir. 1974) (allowing a
nonmutual defensive issue preclusion defense in a contract and Sherman Act case).
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Circuit continued leading this evolution of law and acknowledged the
“virtual obliteration of the mutuality doctrine in [the] Circuit” only
three years after Blonder-Tongue.52 The U.S. Supreme Court
revisited the issue eight years later in Parklane and agreed with lower
courts’ interpretation of Blonder-Tongue—that the decision “strongly
suggested” abandonment of mutuality in all civil litigation, not only
patent cases.53
The Parklane Court confirmed that mutuality is no longer a
requirement of issue preclusion in federal common law.54 The Court
then discussed the different considerations between allowing
defensive preclusion and allowing offensive preclusion. 55 Under
federal law, nonmutual defensive issue preclusion is now allowed as
the default rule, whereas a plaintiff may only assert issue preclusion
offensively in certain cases.56 The Court explained the limitation on a
plaintiff’s assertion of nonmutual preclusion: “in cases where a
plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where . . . the
application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a
trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral
estoppel.”57 Offensive issue preclusion is unfair to the defendant and
thus impermissible when, for example, the defendant had less
incentive to defend itself in the first lawsuit, there are inconsistent
prior decisions on the issue, or the second lawsuit allows the
defendant more favorable procedures than the first lawsuit.58
52. Id.
53. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 327–28 (“[T]he Court in Blonder-Tongue . . . abandoned the mutuality
requirement, at least in cases where a patentee seeks to relitigate the validity of a patent after a federal
court in a previous lawsuit has already declared it invalid. The ‘broader question’ before the Court,
however, was ‘whether it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one full and fair
opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue.’ The Court strongly suggested a negative answer to
that question.” (quoting Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 328) (citation omitted)). In a later case, the Court
limited nonmutual issue preclusion in litigation against the government. See United States v. Mendoza,
464 U.S. 154, 157–61 (1984).
54. See generally Parklane, 439 U.S. 322.
55. Id. at 329–32.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 331.
58. Id. at 330–31. The Parklane Court explained:
If a defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he may have
little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future suits are not foreseeable.
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Not all Parklane Justices supported this further erosion of the
mutuality requirement.59 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist discussed
the Seventh Amendment implications of allowing offensive issue
preclusion.60 Rehnquist argued that if a plaintiff can preclude an issue
using this procedural doctrine when the first case was a bench trial,
then the defendant unconstitutionally loses his right to present that
issue to a jury in the new lawsuit. 61 Rehnquist also opined that,
regardless of the constitutionality, depriving defendants of a jury trial
is always unfair. 62 Partially due to these concerns, many states have
not permitted offensive use of issue preclusion at all. 63
Allowing offensive collateral estoppel may also be unfair to a defendant if the
judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more
previous judgments in favor of the defendant. Still another situation where it might be
unfair to apply offensive estoppel is where the second action affords the defendant
procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a
different result.
Id. (citations omitted). In more recent cases, the Court clarified that procedural opportunities are unfair
to the defendant—and should therefore preclude a claimant’s offensive assertion of issue preclusion—
only when the procedures in the first case were unfair to the defendant; fair but simply “different”
procedures in the first lawsuit would not necessarily weigh this factor unfavorably towards defendants.
B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 575 U.S. 138, 158 (2015) (“Rather than focusing on whether
procedural differences exist—they often will—the correct inquiry is whether the procedures used in the
first proceeding were fundamentally poor, cursory, or unfair.”); see also Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 163–64 (1979) (holding the defendant was precluded from relitigating issues previously
decided in a state court because the defendant did not allege “unfairness or inadequacy in the state
procedures”). Using that reasoning, the Court in B & B Hardware held that issue preclusion may still be
asserted when an administrative board decided the issue without allowing live witness testimony. 135
U.S. at 158 (“No one disputes that the TTAB and district courts use different procedures. Most notably,
district courts feature live witnesses. Procedural differences, by themselves, however, do not defeat
issue preclusion. Equity courts used different procedures than did law courts, but that did not bar issue
preclusion.”). Similarly, the Parklane defendants were bound by the factual findings of a regulatory
agency, which did not allow jury trials. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330–39.
59. See generally Parklane, 439 U.S. 322.
60. Id. at 337–56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. Id. The Seventh Amendment states, “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
62. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 351 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“In my view, it is ‘unfair’ to apply
offensive collateral estoppel where the party who is sought to be estopped has not had an opportunity to
have the facts of his case determined by a jury.”).
63. FREER, supra note 5, at 628–29 (“[A]pparently most states have not embraced nonmutual
offensive issue preclusion.”); see also, e.g., Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 399
(Iowa 1998) (“Issue preclusion does not require mutuality of parties if it is being invoked defensively
against a party so connected to the former action as to be bound by that resolution.”); Trinity Indus., Inc.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss2/8

14

Gautier: Reluctance Or Apathy?

2021]

RELUCTANCE OR APATHY?

555

2. Choice of Law in Federal Courts
The aforementioned decisions only apply to cases decided under
federal preclusion law.64 When a litigant asserts issue preclusion, the
court deciding the second case—either a state court or a federal
court—must generally apply the preclusion law of the jurisdiction
that decided the first case. 65 When the first case was decided in a
federal court under federal question jurisdiction, then federal
preclusion law applies. 66 When a federal court sitting in diversity

v. McKinnon Bridge Co., 77 S.W.3d 159, 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (“In Tennessee the offensive use
of collateral estoppel requires that the parties be identical in both actions. Without saying so specifically,
however, Tennessee has not required party mutuality in applying defensive collateral estoppel.”
(citations omitted)), abrogated by Bowen ex rel. Doe v. Arnold, 502 S.W.3d 102 (Tenn. 2016).
64. FREER, supra note 5, at 639–51; see also Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S.
497, 508–09 (2001) (noting that each state can develop its own preclusion law). Federal preclusion
law—as outlined in Blonder-Tongue and Parklane, among other cases—is binding authority in federal
courts when both the first and second lawsuits were in federal court on federal question jurisdiction.
FREER, supra note 5, at 651; see also Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946) (“It has been held in
non-diversity cases, since Erie v. Tompkins, that the federal courts will apply their own rule of res
judicata.” (citations omitted)); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 956
(2d Cir. 1964) (“Since [both actions] present questions of federal law, we are free to follow our own
conceptions as to the effect of the judgment in the former on the latter . . . .” (citations omitted)); Maher
v. GSI Lumonics, Inc., 433 F.3d 123, 126 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[B]ecause the judgment in [the previous
case] was rendered by a federal court exercising federal question jurisdiction, the applicability of res
judicata is a matter of federal law.” (citation omitted)). Similarly, state courts should apply federal
preclusion law when the first action was in federal court under federal question jurisdiction. FREER,
supra note 5, at 648. However, not all state courts consistently apply this rule. Erichson, supra note 8, at
1008 (“Of the 286 federal-state preclusion cases examined, the state court relied solely on its own state
preclusion law in 169 cases (59%). The state court relied on federal preclusion law in [sixty-two] cases
(22%). In an additional [thirty-six] cases (13%), the court appeared to rely on both its own and federal
preclusion law.”).
65. FREER, supra note 5, at 639–51. Issue preclusion can apply across jurisdictions and judicial
systems. See generally Erichson, supra note 8. When the first lawsuit and the second lawsuit are in state
courts of different states, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and the related federal
statute support the rule that the court in the second suit must adhere to the preclusion law of the state
that decided the first suit. U.S. CONST. art. IV; 28 U.S.C. § 1738; FREER, supra note 5, at 639–41.
However, scholars disagree on the extent of the application of the other state’s preclusion law in certain
circumstances, including regarding whether mutuality is a core component of a state’s preclusion law or
rather a “minute detail” that should not apply in state-to-state preclusion. FREER, supra note 5, at 639–
41. When a state court decides the first lawsuit and a federal court hears the second suit, that federal
court generally should apply the state preclusion law of the first-lawsuit state. Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (“Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to
state court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do
so . . . .” (citation omitted)).
66. Allan D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66
MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1739, 1745 (1968).
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jurisdiction decided the first case, the court in the second case should
follow the law of the state where that federal diversity court sits in
accordance with choice of law doctrines.67 The significance of this
distinction emerges when examining the differing mutuality
requirements between the states. 68
B. Other States
The majority of states have mirrored federal courts and abandoned
strict mutuality as a necessary element of issue preclusion. 69 In fact,
some states began to question the mutuality dogma decades before
the U.S. Supreme Court examined the issue.70
The modern trend towards allowing nonmutual preclusion
arguably began with the influential 1942 California case Bernhard v.
67. Semtek Int’l, 531 U.S. at 508–09; see also Vestal, supra note 66, at 1739, 1745. Some earlier
decisions left ambiguity about which forum’s preclusion law applies and suggested the need for a
case-by-case Erie Doctrine analysis. See Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 453
F.2d 1177, 1181 (3d Cir. 1972) (“The question whether the federal court shall apply the state law of
collateral estoppel is a close one, because of the tension between the ‘outcome-determinative’ test of
Guaranty Trust and the relation to the state-created rights test of Byrd. Therefore, prudence indicates
that the further analysis suggested by Byrd should also be explored.”). The rule from Semtek clarified
that a federal court judgment’s preclusive effect should be analyzed under federal common law
jurisprudence, but that the federal common law mandates use of state law when the federal court sat in
diversity jurisdiction. See generally Semtek Int’l, 531 U.S. 497.
68. See Erichson, supra note 8, at 965–69. Issue preclusion generally applies even when another
jurisdiction adjudicated the first lawsuit. Id. Further analysis of choice of law and issue preclusion
between different states and court systems is beyond the scope of this Note. Importantly, however, “the
most important [jurisdictional] split in preclusion law concerns mutuality.” Id.
69. See Schopler, supra note 17, § 4(a); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. L. INST.
1982).
70. See, e.g., Atkinson v. White, 60 Me. 396, 401 (1872); Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery,
9 N.E.2d 758, 759 (N.Y. 1937). The early state cases were not necessarily suggesting the abandonment
of the mutuality requirement per se; rather, courts carved out exceptions to mutuality. See Good Health
Dairy Prods., 9 N.E.2d at 759 (“An apparent exception to this rule of mutuality has been held to exist
where the liability of the defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one exonerated in a
prior suit upon the same facts, when sued by the same plaintiff.” (quoting Bigelow v. Old Dominion
Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1912))); Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 172
A. 260, 263 (Del. Super. Ct. 1934) (allowing a broad public policy exception to mutuality). Notably, the
exception based on vicarious liability and indemnification was widely accepted. See, e.g., Featherson v.
Newburgh & C. Tpk. Co., 24 N.Y.S. 603, 605 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1893) (“The relation between [the
defendant in the first case] and the [current] defendant was analogous to that of principal and agent, or
principal and surety, or master and servant; and the rule in such cases is that a judgment in favor of the
principal or the surety, upon a ground equally applicable to both, should be accepted as conclusive
against the plaintiff’s right of action.” (citations omitted)).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss2/8

16

Gautier: Reluctance Or Apathy?

2021]

RELUCTANCE OR APATHY?

557

Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n.71 In Bernhard, the
California Supreme Court noted that many courts already applied
broad exceptions to mutuality such as expanding the scope of privity
and allowing nonmutual preclusion in cases of derivative liability or
indemnity.72 After a thorough survey of scholarly materials and prior
cases, the Bernhard court found “no compelling reason” and “[n]o
satisfactory rationalization” for the maintenance of the traditional
mutuality requirement.73 Instead, the court held that the rationale for
permitting nonmutual defensive preclusion applies whether or not the
defendants share a master–servant or agent–principal relationship: “It
would be unjust to permit one who has had his day in court to reopen
identical issues merely by switching adversaries.”74 Justice Traynor,
writing for the California Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion,
concluded that once a plaintiff has had a chance to litigate an issue,
then that plaintiff should be bound by the resulting judgment,

71. 122 P.2d 892, 894–95 (Cal. 1942); see also Michael J. Waggoner, Fifty Years of Bernard v. Bank
of America Is Enough: Collateral Estoppel Should Require Mutuality but Res Judicata Should Not, 12
REV. LITIG. 391, 392 (1993) (“The law of who may invoke collateral estoppel . . . has developed . . . for
fifty years, starting with Bernhard v. Bank of America.”). See generally Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of
Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957). This case has been so
influential to the development of the law on this matter that the abandonment of mutuality is often
referred to as the “Bernhard doctrine.” See, e.g., Steven P. Nonkes, Reducing the Unfair Effects of
Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Through Damages Limits, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1459 (2009). The
U.S. Supreme Court cited Bernhard as persuasive authority in its landmark Blonder-Tongue case.
Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324 (1971).
72. Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 894–95. The court gave examples of derivative liability: “master and
servant, principal and agent, and indemnitor and indemnitee.” Id. at 895. In those types of tort cases, if a
court found that either the master or the servant (or the principal or agent, employer or employee, etc.)
did not negligently cause the plaintiff’s injuries, then the plaintiff cannot relitigate the negligence issue
by bringing a new suit against whichever party (either master or servant) that the plaintiff chose not to
initially name in the first suit for the same alleged injuries. Id.
73. Id. at 892–95. The Bernhard case involved the estate of Clara Sather. Id. at 893. Before her
death, Sather allowed Charles Cook to withdraw money from her bank account. Id. After her death,
Cook and Sather’s heirs disputed the status of the funds transferred to Cook. Id. The probate court
held—over Sather’s heirs’ objections—that Cook received the funds as a gift; thus, a proper accounting
of the estate should not include those funds. Id. Helen Bernhard, Sather’s daughter, then filed a separate
suit against the bank for transferring the funds to Cook. Id. The bank asserted a preclusion defense,
citing the probate court’s prior ruling regarding the funds. Id. at 893–94. Despite not being a party to the
probate court case (i.e., despite a lack of mutuality), the bank won the case. Id. at 894.
74. Id. at 895 (“The cases justify this [derivative liability] exception on the ground that it would be
unjust to permit one who has had his day in court to reopen identical issues by merely switching
adversaries.”).
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regardless of any derivative liability or privity between defendants. 75
Courts throughout the country continue to cite this case as persuasive
authority for the proposition of permitting nonmutual defensive issue
preclusion.76
A majority of states now follow the Bernhard doctrine and the rule
from Blonder-Tongue and allow nonmutual defensive issue
preclusion.77 A significant plurality of states allow both nonmutual
defensive and nonmutual offensive issue preclusion in at least some
circumstances.78 Only a very few states have declined to change the
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Foster v. Plock, 394 P.3d 1119, 1123–24 (Colo. 2017) (recognizing that the “oft-cited”
Bernhard case “has been universally understood and applied” as a case abandoning the mutuality
requirement of issue preclusion). The Colorado Supreme Court in Foster also recognized a trend in early
issue preclusion cases where courts used the term “res judicata” to mean both claim and issue
preclusion, leading to confusion in how to correctly apply precedent. Id. In modern terminology, res
judicata refers to claim preclusion, a similar but distinct doctrine from issue preclusion. Id. The court
failed to find any jurisdiction that eliminated the mutuality requirement for claim preclusion. Id. at
1124–25.
77. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ohio Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 145 F.3d 793, 801 n.14 (6th Cir. 1998) (“In
Ohio, the general rule is that mutuality of parties is a prerequisite to the offensive use of issue
preclusion.” (citing Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978 (Ohio 1983))); Doe v.
Doe, 52 P.3d 255, 264–65 (Haw. 2002); Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Iowa
1998) (“[I]ssue preclusion does not require mutuality of parties if it is being invoked defensively against
a party so connected to the former action as to be bound by that resolution.” (citing Brown v. Kassouf,
558 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Iowa 1997))); Rourke v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 863 A.2d 926, 938 (Md. 2004)
(“[W]e have yet to formally embrace offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel.”); Monat v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 677 N.W.2d 843, 852 (Mich. 2004); McInnis & Assocs., Inc. v. Hall, 349 S.E.2d 552, 560
(N.C. 1986); Trinity Indus., Inc. v. McKinnon Bridge Co., 77 S.W.3d 159, 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)
(“In Tennessee the offensive use of collateral estoppel requires that the parties be identical in both
actions. Without saying so specifically, however, Tennessee has not required party mutuality in applying
defensive collateral estoppel.” (citations omitted)), abrogated by Bowen ex rel. Doe v. Arnold, 502
S.W.3d 102 (Tenn. 2016).
78. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Ariz. State Real Est. Dep’t, 727 P.2d 825, 828 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986);
Johnson v. Union Pac. R.R., 104 S.W.3d 745, 751 (Ark. 2003); Bassett v. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs,
727 P.2d 864, 866 (Colo. App. 1986); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 596 A.2d 414, 422–23 (Conn.
1991) (“[M]utuality of parties is no longer required to invoke collateral estoppel.”); Messick v. Star
Enter., 655 A.2d 1209, 1210 (Del. 1995); Mastrangelo v. Sandstrom, Inc., 55 P.3d 298, 303 (Idaho
2002); Herzog v. Lexington Twp., 657 N.E.2d 926, 930 (Ill. 1995); Tofany v. NBS Imaging Sys., Inc.,
616 N.E.2d 1034, 1037–38 (Ind. 1993); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 766 (Me. 1979) (“[T]he
doctrine of mutuality of estoppel should no longer govern the application of collateral estoppel in the
courts of this State.”); Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 907 (Minn. 1996); In re
Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Mo. 1997); Cover v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 75
N.W.2d 661, 668 (Neb. 1956); Cutter v. Town of Durham, 411 A.2d 1120, 1121 (N.H. 1980); Silva v.
State, 745 P.2d 380, 384 (N.M. 1987) (“[T]he doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel may be applied
when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously
litigated unsuccessfully regardless of whether plaintiff was privy to the prior action.”); Koch v. Consol.
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strict mutuality rule.79 Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Georgia, North
Dakota, and Virginia follow the strict mutuality standard.80
C. Georgia Law
Georgia courts usually do not use the term mutuality but instead
use the synonymous phrase “identity of parties or their privies.”81
Edison Co. of N.Y., 468 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 1984); In re Est. of Ellis, 333 A.2d 728, 730–31 (Pa. 1975);
Doe v. Doe, 551 S.E.2d 257, 259 (S.C. 2001); Scott v. City of Newport, 857 A.2d 317, 321 (Vt. 2004)
(“[W]e have abandoned the doctrine of mutuality . . . .” (citations omitted)); Sumpter ex rel. Michelle T.
v. Crozier, 495 N.W.2d 327, 335 (Wis. 1993); Tex. W. Oil & Gas Corp. v. First Interstate Bank of
Casper, 743 P.2d 857, 864–65 (Wyo. 1987).
79. See, e.g., Jones v. Blanton, 644 So. 2d 882, 886 (Ala. 1994) (“Although many courts, including
the Federal courts, have dispensed with the mutuality requirement, it remains the law in Alabama.”);
Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 919–20 (Fla. 1995) (“[W]e are unwilling to follow the lead of
certain other states and of the federal courts in abandoning the requirements of mutuality in the
application of collateral estoppel.”); Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380, 384
(N.D. 1992) (“For purposes of both res judicata and collateral estoppel in this state, only parties or their
privies may take advantage of or be bound by the former judgment.”); Scales v. Lewis, 541 S.E.2d 899,
901 (Va. 2001) (“[T]here also must be ‘mutuality,’ i.e., a litigant cannot invoke collateral estoppel
unless he would have been bound had the litigation of the issue in the prior action reached the opposite
result.” (quoting Angstadt v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 457 S.E.2d 86, 87 (Va. 1995))).
80. Erichson, supra note 8, at 966 (“A number of states cling to the traditional mutuality
requirement. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Virginia require
mutuality.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Cook Inlet Keeper v. State, 46 P.3d 957, 966 (Alaska 2002)
(requiring mutuality for issue preclusion in Alaska). Although most sources cite Mississippi as among
the states requiring strict mutuality, the matter may actually be unsettled. See Hoffheimer, supra note 6,
at 524 (“Although some legal sources have claimed that Mississippi still requires mutuality, the
Mississippi Supreme Court has expressly rejected mutuality as a precondition for collateral estoppel. At
the same time, the Mississippi court’s opinions are not entirely consistent in explaining whether
nonmutual preclusion is encouraged or disfavored.”). The Virginia Supreme Court acknowledged the
modern trend but declined to adopt it and instead reaffirmed strict mutuality in 1987. Selected Risks Ins.
Co. v. Dean, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581 (Va. 1987) (“We perceive no error, flagrant or otherwise, or mistake
committed by the Court in 1980 in [Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 272 S.E.2d 217 (Va.
1980)] when we declined to follow a ‘trend’ and abrogate the requirement of mutuality. Thus, we will
follow our established precedent.”). Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court was not convinced by the
judicial efficiency and economic arguments in favor of abandoning the mutuality requirement. Stogniew,
656 So. 2d at 919–20 (“Further, we are unwilling to follow the lead of certain other states and of the
federal courts in abandoning the requirements of mutuality in the application of collateral
estoppel. . . . We are not convinced that any judicial economies which might be achieved by eliminating
mutuality would be sufficient to affect our concerns over fairness for the litigants. We also note that
many other courts continue to adhere to the doctrine of mutuality.”).
81. See, e.g., Nally v. Bartow Cnty. Grand Jurors, 633 S.E.2d 337, 339 (Ga. 2006) (“Collateral
estoppel, like res judicata, requires identity of parties or privity.”); Daniel v. Daniel, 596 S.E.2d 608,
611 (Ga. 2004) (“The collateral estoppel doctrine precludes the re-litigation of an issue previously
adjudicated on the merits in an action between the same parties or their privies.”); see also Schopler,
supra note 17 (“The mutuality requirement is closely related to, and for all practical purposes about
coextensive with, the requirement of identity of parties or privity. It has been said that the requirement
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Current Georgia law requires “identity of parties or their privies” in
the first and the second lawsuits for a party to use issue preclusion. 82
The remaining elements of issue preclusion in Georgia largely mirror
federal courts and black letter law. 83 Issue preclusion in Georgia
requires all of the following elements: (1) identity of issues, (2)
actual litigation of the issue in the first action, (3) necessity of the
issue to the outcome of the first action, and (4) the result of a final
judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction in the
first action.84 Notably, however, Georgia courts often apply issue
preclusion law inconsistently and confuse the proper elements. 85
Although issue preclusion remains a common law doctrine, the
legislature arguably codified some of its elements in a state statute
providing that a judgment on an issue by a competent court binds the

of identity of parties is commonly known as the requirement of mutuality.”). Some scholars “have also
recognized that at least theoretically, there is some difference between [identity of parties and
mutuality], and that to the extent that they are divergent, the requirement of mutuality is broader.”
Schopler, supra note 17. However, for the purposes of this Note, the identity of parties element will be
treated as the same as the strict mutuality requirement because the practical and policy considerations
are identical, and Georgia courts have not distinguished the terms. See infra Section II.C.
82. Waldroup v. Greene Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 463 S.E.2d 5, 7 (Ga. 1995) (“Collateral estoppel
precludes the re-adjudication of an issue that has previously been litigated and adjudicated on the merits
in another action between the same parties or their privies.”); Minnifield v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 771
S.E.2d 188, 192 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (“In Georgia, mutual identity of parties is required for collateral
estoppel, which means that there must be an identity of parties or their privies in both actions.” (citations
omitted)); Adams v. Adams, 738 F.3d 861, 865 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Under Georgia law, the doctrine of
issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, ‘precludes the re-adjudication of an issue that has
previously been litigated and adjudicated on the merits in another action between the same parties or
their privies.’” (quoting Shields v. BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 545 S.E.2d 898, 900 (Ga. 2001)));
Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 629 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ga. 2006) (“The related doctrine of collateral
estoppel ‘precludes the re-adjudication of an issue that has previously been litigated and adjudicated on
the merits in another action between the same parties or their privies.’” (quoting Waldroup, 463 S.E.2d
at 7)).
83. Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1264 (11th Cir. 2011). The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit distilled the elements of issue preclusion in Georgia: “A party seeking to assert
collateral estoppel under Georgia law must demonstrate that (1) an identical issue, (2) between identical
parties, (3) was actually litigated and (4) necessarily decided, (5) on the merits, (6) in a final judgment,
(7) by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Id.
84. Id.
85. Morrison v. Morrison, 663 S.E.2d 714, 718 (Ga. 2008) (“Like other Georgia courts in the past,
the superior court ‘fail[ed] to clearly and consistently distinguish the two separate doctrines’ of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.” (quoting Sorrells Constr. Co. v. Chandler Armentrout & Roebuck, 447
S.E.2d 101, 102 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994))).
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parties to that judgment and their privies.86 The statute, however,
does not prevent the judiciary from expanding preclusion law to
nonmutual applications.87 The national trends notwithstanding,
Georgia continues to uphold its status as a strict mutuality state. 88
II. ANALYSIS
“If litigation were costless, both to the litigants and to society, it
might be desirable never to allow collateral estoppel to preclude a
new lawsuit. But as with most mortal endeavors, litigation is not so
blessed.”89 This 1973 quotation from Judge Goldberg of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit encapsulates the necessary
balancing of policy interests with fairness to litigants when applying
issue preclusion law.90 Although scholars have thoroughly opined on
the merits of nonmutual defensive and offensive preclusion, Georgia
practitioners and litigants continue to grapple with the paucity of
applicable case law from the state’s supreme court. Policy
considerations favor mutuality law reform. However, likely due to
apathy or inexplicable reluctance, the Georgia Supreme Court has

86. O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 (2015 & Supp. 2020) (“A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which
under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered
until the judgment is reversed or set aside.”); see also Morrison, 663 S.E.2d at 719 (Benham, J.,
dissenting) (finding that the statute “codifies the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel”).
However, although the elements of collateral estoppel are similar, some Georgia courts have interpreted
this statute as only defining res judicata. See Hardwick v. Williams, 613 S.E.2d 215, 217 (Ga. Ct. App.
2005) (“Under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 the principle of res judicata is defined as follows . . . .”). The fact
that some Georgia courts use “res judicata” to encompass both issue and claim preclusion further
complicates this situation. See, e.g., Waggaman v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 458 S.E.2d 826, 827 (Ga.
1995); ALR Oglethorpe, LLC v. Henderson, 783 S.E.2d 187, 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). Regardless, most
courts do not rely on this statute when applying the doctrine.
87. Cf. Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328, 350 (1971).
(establishing nonmutual defensive issue preclusion as part of federal common law without an explicit
statutory basis).
88. RICHARD C. RUSKELL, DAVIS AND SHULMAN’S GEORGIA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 27:5
(2019–2020 ed. 2019) (“The Georgia Supreme Court has remained consistent in requiring that the
elements of collateral estoppel require identity of parties or their privies in both actions.”).
89. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 1973).
90. Id.
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failed to even consider the merits—or lack thereof—of the state’s
current strict mutuality issue preclusion standard.
A. Policy Considerations Favor Abandoning Strict Mutuality
The policy reasons behind mutuality have been questioned for
more than a century.91 In 1843, Jeremy Bentham famously described
mutuality as “a maxim which one would suppose to have found its
way from the gaming-table to the bench.”92 Prevailing academic and
economic considerations favor the current trend towards nonmutual
preclusion.93 State supreme courts have emphasized various
rationales but have generally—with some notable exceptions—
weighed policy in favor of mutuality reform. 94 Analyzing the policy
considerations through case law of specific jurisdictions provides
additional necessary context to the application of nonmutual
preclusion.
1. Purposes of Issue Preclusion Generally
The traditionally understood policies underlying issue preclusion
include finality of judgments, consistency of judgments, reliance on
judgments, judicial economy, and repose. 95 Reliance, finality, and
consistency are intertwined: when litigants know that issue
preclusion applies to a judgment, they can safely rely on the finality
of that judgment and need not worry about forthcoming inconsistent
91. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
165, 171 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
92. Id. This quotation was cited in Blonder-Tongue, Bernhard, and other leading cases.
Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 322–23; Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892,
895 (Cal. 1942). However, at least one scholar critiqued Bentham’s analogy and suggested that courts
should stop relying on it. See generally Waggoner, supra note 71.
93. See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 286 (“[T]he standards developed in Parklane regarding
offensive non-mutual issue preclusion and its progeny strike the proper balance . . . . [T]he current
standards regarding issue preclusion are working, and any proposal to return to a mutuality regime
would be an unfortunate step backward.”).
94. See discussion infra Sections II.A.1–4.
95. MOORE ET AL., supra note 7, § 132.01 ¶ 3; see also Brian M. Vines, A Doctrine of Faith and
Credit, 94 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (2008) (recognizing “reliance, repose, and finality” as the “core values”
of issue preclusion).
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decisions on an issue.96 Similarly, issue preclusion promotes repose
by signaling to potential defendants that certain issues are settled and
plaintiffs may not bring more claims based on those issues. 97 Judicial
economy refers to the time and resources saved by courts when
preclusion prevents relitigation of an issue.98 In addition to saving
taxpayers money, issue preclusion promotes the efficient use of court
resources to hear other pending claims.99 Nonmutual preclusion
enhances these policies by broadening the scope of issue preclusion
and allowing litigants to assert issue preclusion more often. 100
2. Nonmutual Defensive vs. Nonmutual Offensive Policy
Considerations
After the Bernhard decision, attorneys and judges debated whether
the holding should apply to all assertions of nonmutual preclusion or
only to defensive issue preclusion. 101 Justice Traynor’s conclusion
finding “no compelling reason” and “[n]o satisfactory
rationalization” for maintaining mutuality makes sense as applied to
the facts of the case (a defensive assertion),102 but the policy

96. MOORE ET AL., supra note 7, § 132.01 ¶ 3. Promoting consistent decisions of an issue also
promotes credibility of the court system and avoids judicial embarrassment resulting from inconsistent
decisions of the same issue. Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting the court’s
concern for embarrassment if two or more judges reach different conclusions on the same question of
fact).
97. Repose, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Stephen Michael Sheppard ed., 2012) (“Repose is rest, a
time or state of relief and quietude. In law, repose is the laying to rest of an action or claim, usually at a
given time or after a period has elapsed.”).
98. MOORE ET AL., supra note 7, § 132.01 ¶ 3.
99. Schopler, supra note 17, § 2(a). By advancing this judicial efficiency, issue preclusion benefits
the rights of other injured plaintiffs “who might [otherwise] have to wait to have their day in court
because one litigant is allowed to litigate the same issue over and over again.” Id. The policies
underlying issue preclusion should be viewed not only through the lens of the affected parties to one
specific case, but also from the perspective of “the right of society to have its courts render justice as
inexpensively as possible.” Id.
100. Id. (recognizing that abandoning mutuality equates to “extending the doctrine of collateral
estoppel”); see also Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 298 (“[D]efensive non-mutual issue preclusion
promote[s] the underlying goals of issue preclusion . . . .”).
101. See generally Currie, supra note 71. With regards to federal courts, the U.S. Supreme Court
settled the debate when it “gave its imprimatur to [Justice] Traynor’s dramatic takedown of the
mutuality rule in Bernhard.” Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 282.
102. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 894–95 (Cal. 1942).
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considerations differ when plaintiffs assert issue preclusion
offensively.103
In his frequently cited 1957 Stanford Law Review article, former
University of Chicago Professor of Law Brainerd Currie examined
the Bernhard doctrine and distinguished between offensive and
defensive issue preclusion. 104 Currie illustrated the distinction using a
hypothetical in which a train crash injures fifty passengers.105 If one
passenger sues the railroad for his injuries and the jury finds the
railroad negligent, then the other forty-nine passengers could avail
themselves of that judgment by asserting issue preclusion
offensively.106 Currie opined that this railroad scenario unfairly
benefits plaintiffs.107 If, however, in the same scenario the jury in the
first case finds no negligence by the railroad-defendant, then the
railroad could use that judgment to preclude future litigation of its
negligence in the crash by asserting issue preclusion defensively. 108
Currie correctly noted that this latter situation (nonmutual defensive
preclusion) does not implicate the same concerns of fairness because
of plaintiffs’ strategic advantages in civil litigation.109 Plaintiffs
typically have broad latitude for discretion in choosing when to file a
claim and commence litigation, in which forum to file the claim, and
with whom to join to their claim.110 Currie concluded that the

103. Currie, supra note 71, at 308–09. For background on the Bernhard case, see discussion supra
Section I.B.
104. Currie, supra note 71; see also, e.g., Antonio Gidi, Loneliness in the Crowd: Why Nobody Wants
Opt-Out Class Members to Assert Offensive Issue Preclusion Against Class Defendants, 66 SMU L.
REV. 1, 7 (2013) (citing to Currie’s article and recognizing the article as “popular” with academics
researching issue preclusion). Currie later categorized Justice Traynor’s opinion as “extirpat[ing] the
mutuality requirement and put[ting] it to the torch.” William Sam Byassee, Collateral Estoppel Without
Mutuality: Accepting the Bernhard Doctrine, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1982) (quoting Brainerd
Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25, 26 (1965)).
105. Currie, supra note 71, at 281–82.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 288 (“Plaintiffs possess the initiative—a priceless strategic advantage in litigation as in
war.”).
110. Id. (“Within broad limits, [plaintiffs] can determine the time when and the place where action is
to be brought. Moreover, there is latitude for a considerable amount of collaboration between numbers
of plaintiffs similarly situated . . . .”).
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Bernhard doctrine abandoning mutuality should only apply when
defendants use issue preclusion defensively. 111
Defensive issue preclusion encourages plaintiffs with injuries
stemming from the same event, such as the hypothetical plaintiffs in
the train crash example, to join together in one action, thus giving
them a fair opportunity to fully litigate the issues.112 If there are
multiple potential defendants, then defensive preclusion would
similarly incentivize a plaintiff to choose to join all defendants in one
lawsuit.113 This consolidation of claims and parties prevents
duplicative use of courts’ resources, and it allows defendants to
divert their resources to more economically productive ends instead
of squandering time and money to relitigate decided issues.114
In this sense, defensive issue preclusion alleviates the “aura of the
gaming table” created by the traditional mutuality requirement. 115
Bentham’s “gaming table” metaphor analogizes plaintiffs choosing
new defendants with gamblers who may lose at one Blackjack table
but can then try again with a new hand and have another chance to
win.116 Under strict mutuality, plaintiffs can advance some arguments
against one defendant, lose, choose a new defendant—and perhaps
even a new forum or judge—and then attempt new arguments to try
and prevail against the new defendant on the exact same issue.117 One
111. Currie, supra note 71, at 322.
112. Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 297–301. In contrast to invoking offensive issue preclusion (a
“sword”), using issue preclusion defensively (a “shield”) “promote[s] the underlying goals of issue
preclusion—peace, efficiency, and consistency.” Id. at 298–99.
113. Id. at 299–300.
114. Id. When a defendant must relitigate the same issue separately against new plaintiffs, “there is an
arguable misallocation of resources.” Id. at 299 (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
329 (1979)). Additionally, “the defendant’s time and money are diverted from alternative uses—
productive or otherwise—to relitigation of a decided issue.” Id. (quoting Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329).
115. Id. at 300 (quoting Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329).
116. BENTHAM, supra note 92, at 171.
117. Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 298–300. The article explains:
And, still assuming that the issue was resolved correctly in the first suit, there is
reason to be concerned about the plaintiff’s allocation of resources. Permitting
repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants
holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table or “a lack of discipline and of
disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for
fashioning rules of procedure.”
Id. at 299–300 (quoting Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)).
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single injury could give rise to unlimited claims as long as unrelated
defendants exist.118
These clear injustices and inefficiencies are not as pronounced
when applying nonmutual offensive issue preclusion. Indeed, some
commentators argue that offensive preclusion actually lessens
judicial economy because it incentivizes plaintiffs to “wait and see”
the holding of a “test case” by another similarly situated plaintiff
instead of joining the suit. 119 On the other hand, if the defendant
knows that the result of the first plaintiff’s trial will affect the results
of other foreseeable claims arising out of the same factual issues,
then the rule incentivizes the defendant to more zealously defend that
first case in the same way that the defendant would defend against a
claim by joint plaintiffs.120
Moreover, jurisdictions that allow nonmutual offensive issue
preclusion recognize exceptions in cases where its application
unfairly benefits the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. 121 The
U.S. Supreme Court in Parklane listed a series of factors that lower
federal courts should consider in their discretionary application of
nonmutual offensive preclusion, including whether the first case
provided the defendant with the same procedural opportunities,
whether the defendant had similar incentives to litigate the issue in

118. Id. at 299. For example, suppose a pedestrian suffers injuries when he is struck by a car while
crossing a busy street. Suppose further that, under unambiguous state law, pedestrians do not have a
cognizable claim for injuries suffered as a result of illegal jaywalking. The pedestrian then sues the
driver of the car that hit him and loses at trial after the trier of fact finds that the pedestrian was
jaywalking. Because of the hypothetical state law, the dispositive fact that the plaintiff crossed the street
illegally prevents him from obtaining damages for his injuries from any potentially negligent party.
However, in a strict mutuality state like Georgia, the pedestrian could now step back up to the “gaming
table” and bring a new suit against another driver, the car manufacturer, the road designer, the city, or
any other potential defendant, and he would have the right to relitigate the issue of whether he
jaywalked. Id. The plaintiff may lose three lawsuits, but a favorable jury in the fourth suit could find that
he was not jaywalking, and he could proceed to proving damages. Id.
119. Id. at 305 (“[O]ffensive non-mutual issue preclusion may encourage a ‘wait and see’ attitude by
plaintiffs and proliferation of litigation.” (quoting Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329–30)).
120. Erichson, supra note 8, at 950–52 (“If offensive nonmutual issue preclusion is allowed, a mass
tort defendant—or any defendant facing a large number of lawsuits growing out of a single incident or
related series of incidents—correctly perceives the first trial as a ‘must win’ situation.”). This example
illustrates “how preclusion law affects zealousness of advocacy.” Id. at 952.
121. See, e.g., Parklane, 439 U.S. at 328–30.
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the first case, and whether the plaintiff could have easily joined the
first suit.122 The Parklane Court also referenced Professor Currie’s
railroad hypothetical when it held that a party could not use
preclusion offensively in cases of prior inconsistent decisions.123
Allowing nonmutual offensive issue preclusion with these
qualifications serves the dual functions of promoting the underlying
policy goals of issue preclusion while preserving due process and
fairness to all parties.124
With regard to any assertion of issue preclusion—offensive or
defensive—“the requirement of determining whether the party
against whom an estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate is a most significant safeguard” against abuse and
unfairness.125 More broadly, the party asserting issue preclusion must
also meet the other elements of issue preclusion, including proving
that the contested issue was actually litigated and decided in the first
action.126 These other requirements provide additional safeguards
against unfairness.127

122. Id. at 328–31.
123. Id. at 330 (“Allowing offensive collateral estoppel may also be unfair to a defendant if the
judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous
judgments in favor of the defendant.”). The Court explained that nonmutual offensive issue preclusion
should not apply in circumstances like Currie’s hypothetical, which the court paraphrased:
In Professor Currie’s familiar example, a railroad collision injures [fifty] passengers
all of whom bring separate actions against the railroad. After the railroad wins the
first [twenty-five] suits, a plaintiff wins in suit [twenty-six]. Professor Currie argues
that offensive use of collateral estoppel should not be applied so as to allow plaintiffs
[twenty-seven] through [fifty] automatically to recover.
Id. at 330 n.14.
124. See generally Cavanagh, supra note 23.
125. Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
126. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3.
127. Cavanagh, supra note 23, at 304. Although “federal courts, most state courts, and the drafters of
the Restatement” recognize nonmutual issue preclusion, “a sizable number of skeptics are still
unconvinced.” Nonkes, supra note 71, at 1459. Commentators continue to propose novel ways for
courts to maximize efficiency and fairness when applying issue preclusion, including “rules limiting the
amount recoverable in damages by a plaintiff who relies upon offensive nonmutual issue preclusion to
establish an element of the cause of action.” Id.
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3. The Maine Supreme Court Provides More than a Century of
Sound Policy Analysis Supporting Nonmutual Preclusion
Examination of Maine’s common law is worthy of its own Section
because it provides a holistic case study and a blueprint for other
states to follow. The Maine Supreme Court has provided perhaps the
most thorough analysis of the policy rationales for and against
maintaining strict mutuality.128
In the 1872 decision Atkinson v. White, the Maine Supreme Court
explained that the mutuality requirement in the state originated from
an ancient rule that prevented someone from acting both as a party
and a witness in a case. 129 Adhering to the mutuality requirement
prevented the unfair result of a party asserting issue preclusion when
he had to testify in the first case and therefore could not qualify as an
adverse party.130 Because a statute had changed this party–witness
rule, the court saw no reason to uphold strict mutuality and held that
a party may assert nonmutual preclusion.131
128. See generally, e.g., Atkinson v. White, 60 Me. 396 (1872); Biddle & Smart Co. v. Burnham, 40
A. 669 (Me. 1898); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762 (Me. 1979).
129. Atkinson, 60 Me. at 399–400.
130. Id. The court explained the historical reasons for mutuality:
But if we hold that the old principle, that “estoppels must be mutual,” is applicable to
this case, ought we to be bound by it any longer?
That law was adopted when parties could not be witnesses, and from a very
tender care of suitors, lest by possibility injustice might be done. For it is said, and
this appears to be the only reason on which the law is founded, that “if the adverse
party was not also a party to the judgment offered in evidence, it may have been
obtained upon his own testimony; in which case, to allow him to derive a benefit
from it would be unjust.”
Id. at 399.
131. Id. at 399–400. The court repeatedly questioned the reasons for continued adherence to the
mutuality requirement in light of this change in witness rules:
Since the statute, making parties and all interested persons witnesses, this foundation
has been taken away. No danger of injustice from that source now exists; and the
reason of the law having ceased, why should the law be retained? It should be
remembered that this is not a question in which these parties alone have an interest.
Other suitors, waiting for their turn should not be delayed by repeated trials of the
same question, not required to secure justice. Public policy also requires that there
should be an end of litigation. If this matter has been once adjudicated upon, even the
defendants themselves cannot waive that adjudication if they would. It has become
the law of the case, and binding upon all parties who have had an opportunity to be
heard thereon.
We can see no possible ground of suspicion even of injustice to the plaintiff in
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The policy reasons that the Atkinson court articulated in 1872 still
apply today.132 The court noted that justice would be delayed by
parties “waiting for their turn” and relitigating the same issue
repeatedly.133 Additionally, the court held that final judgments should
stand as “binding upon all parties who have had an opportunity to be
heard” and that “[p]ublic policy . . . requires that there should be an
end of litigation.”134 Despite these well-articulated policy reasons, the
Maine Supreme Court distinguished Atkinson when it revisited the
mutuality issue in 1898 and held that “the rule requiring mutuality is
too well established . . . to be lightly set aside.”135
The Maine case study, however, does not end in the nineteenth
century. After Parklane changed federal law in 1979, the plaintiff in
Hossler v. Barry urged Maine to once again abandon mutuality. 136
True to form, the Maine Supreme Court thoroughly examined the
available literature and analyzed the policy reasons favoring and
opposing mutuality.137 The predominant policy argument in favor of
the strict mutuality standard focused on preserving the illusion of
fairness through symmetry—because the first lawsuit did not bind the
litigant asserting nonmutual preclusion, that litigant should not have
the benefit of asserting the decision of the first suit to his advantage
when his adversary could not use it against him. 138 As the court
holding the former judgment against him conclusive.
Id.
132. Id.; see also discussion supra Section II.A.2.
133. Atkinson, 60 Me. at 400.
134. Id.
135. Biddle & Smart Co. v. Burnham, 40 A. 669, 671 (Me. 1898) (“We do not find that the
suggestion of the court in [Atkinson] has ever been adopted, here or elsewhere, and it seems to us that
the rule requiring mutuality is too well established by authority, and rests upon too substantial reasons,
to be lightly set aside.”).
136. Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 766 (Me. 1979) (“Rather, plaintiff urges the Court to abandon
the doctrine because it ‘does not comport with modern theories of jurisprudence.’”).
137. See id. at 766–70.
138. Id. at 767 (“The doctrine was premised on the belief that it would be fundamentally unfair to
allow a party who was an entire stranger to the first suit to use that judgment in a subsequent action
since, as a stranger, the judgment in the first suit could not be used against him.”). A party to the first
lawsuit cannot assert issue preclusion against a new party (i.e., a stranger) in the second lawsuit because
constitutional due process requirements mandate that each party must have at least one “opportunity to
be heard.” Id. at 767 n.5. The Third Circuit confronted—and disagreed with—a similar argument for
maintaining “symmetry” in Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1950). See supra
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pointed out, however, that view fails to explain why a party deserves
more than one opportunity to litigate the same issue. 139 Rather, a rule
allowing nonmutual defensive issue preclusion ensures that plaintiffs
actually fully litigate their issue by obligating them to join all
potential defendants in one lawsuit. 140 The Hossler opinion
approvingly cited the Atkinson case, as well as Bernhard, BlonderTongue, and other authorities, to conclude that “there was no tenable
reason” not to allow defensive issue preclusion. 141
However, because the facts of the Hossler case involved a plaintiff
attempting to assert issue preclusion against a stranger-defendant, the
court also analyzed the more nuanced policy arguments regarding
allowing offensive issue preclusion. 142 In contrast to defensive
preclusion, offensive preclusion assertions by a new plaintiff do not
necessarily encourage judicial economy because a plaintiff can
theoretically use a wait-and-see approach.143 If another
similarly-situated plaintiff resolves the decisive issue, such as
negligence, against the same defendant, then the new plaintiff can file
a new suit and assert issue preclusion instead of joining the first
lawsuit.144 Despite these concerns, the court held that nonmutual
offensive issue preclusion may be allowed on a case-by-case basis
after a court applies Parklane-esque fairness factors to the factual
circumstances.145
notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
139. Hossler, 403 A.2d at 767 (“[W]hile every party was entitled to his day in court there was no
tenable reason why a litigant should have more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution
of the same issue.”).
140. Id. at 768 (“When used defensively, collateral estoppel encourages a plaintiff to join all potential
defendants in a single action since if he sues and loses he will not be entitled to a second bite at the
apple.”).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 764, 768–70.
143. Id. at 768 (“The offensive use, by contrast, does not promote judicial economy since a plaintiff
has every incentive to avoid suit until a prior plaintiff has obtained a judgment against the defendant.”).
144. Id.
145. Hossler, 403 A.2d at 769 (“We are persuaded that the reasons justifying collateral estoppel
would generally be advanced by permitting its use offensively on a case-by-case basis. . . . Many factors
have been considered in determining whether the defendant has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
in the prior suit . . . .”). Although the court used this opportunity to articulate that the law now allows
offensive issue preclusion, the court held that its use under the facts of this case would be unfair to the
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4. States Choosing to Retain Mutuality Fail to Articulate Any
Novel Rationales
Issue preclusion law has trended away from strict mutuality for
many years.146 However, even in light of modern trends, a few states
have chosen to retain the mutuality element. 147
In the aftermath of Blonder-Tongue, Florida appellate courts
approvingly cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning and began
allowing nonmutual applications of issue preclusion.148 A 1992
article in the Florida Bar Journal even applauded “the silent demise
of the mutuality requirement” in the state.149 Despite this apparent
consensus, the Florida Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed the
traditional mutuality requirement in 1995 in Stogniew v. McQueen.150
The court agreed with its reasoning in earlier cases that the judicial
economy benefits of nonmutual defensive preclusion are overstated
because allowing nonmutual defensive preclusion can lead to
additional appeals by the plaintiff.151 The court did not cite any
statistics or other evidence to support that proposition.152 As the court

defendant. Id. at 770. The court reasoned that the defendant “could not reasonably have foreseen either
that the presiding Justice would abrogate a long-standing common-law rule or its reformulation on
appeal in terms of a full and fair opportunity to litigate.” Id.
146. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464.
147. See sources cited supra note 80.
148. Donald A. Blackwell, The Silent Demise of the Mutuality Requirement in the Defensive Use of
Collateral Estoppel, 66. FLA. BAR J. 18, 18 (1992) (“[T]he Third and Second district courts of appeal
have made it clear that, at long last, Florida courts have fully embraced the rule of Blonder-Tongue and
its progeny permitting the defensive use of collateral estoppel in the absence of strict mutuality.”).
149. See generally id.
150. 656 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1995); see also Deric Zacca, Florida’s Position on Nonmutual Collateral
Estoppel After Stogniew, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 889, 889, 899 (1998).
151. See Stogniew, 656 So. 2d at 919–20 (first citing Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc.
v. Romano, 450 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1984), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT. § 772.14 (1986), as
recognized in Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 1995); and then citing Zeidwig v. Ward,
548 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989)). Under section 772.14, “Florida courts continue to require the mutuality of
parties in deciding whether to give preclusive effect to a prior civil judgment. [But] Florida law does not
require the mutuality of parties for criminal judgments.” Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986,
993 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). For a thorough discussion of mutuality and issue preclusion
law in Florida, see Zacca, supra note 150.
152. See generally Stogniew, 656 So. 2d 917; Romano, 450 So. 2d 843.
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hinted in a prior case, perhaps its true motivation was retaining
support from the plaintiffs’ bar.153
Virginia also examined the issue and opted to continue requiring
mutuality.154 The precedential decisions of the Virginia Supreme
Court, however, only address and rebut arguments for offensive
preclusion use.155 The court concluded that because nonmutual
offensive preclusion raises significant fairness concerns, the state
should not adopt any modern mutuality principles. 156 Due to these
holdings, Virginia remains a strict mutuality state even though the
Virginia Supreme Court has not thoroughly addressed the meritorious
arguments for allowing only defensive preclusion. 157
B. Distinguishing Mutuality from Privity
Nonmutuality and privity are both ways for courts to allow
nonparties—nonparties to the prior litigation—to assert issue
preclusion.158 Nonmutuality determines if a named party in one
153. Romano, 450 So. 2d at 846 (“[W]e are not convinced that the burden under which the plaintiffs’
bar now labors is so onerous that defendants’ rights should be compromised to ease it. Plaintiffs have
been equal to proving all the elements of liability heretofore. To change the status quo risks prejudice to
defendants which is not necessary to serve the ends of justice.”).
154. Weinberger v. Tucker, 510 F.3d 486, 491 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n Virginia, collateral estoppel
requires a fourth element, mutuality.”).
155. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 272 S.E.2d 217, 220 (Va. 1980). Norfolk is the
leading Virginia case on mutuality. See generally id. Because the party attempting to assert mutuality in
that case was the plaintiff, the court addressed only the arguments for offensive mutuality. Id. at 220.
Even though the court said that “the established rule is that collateral estoppel requires
mutuality, . . . especially when the estoppel is used ‘offensively,’” subsequent Virginia Supreme Court
decisions reaffirmed that defensive issue preclusion was similarly not permitted. Id. at 219 (citations
omitted); see also Rawlings v. Lopez, 591 S.E.2d 691, 692 (Va. 2004) (“In Bailey, this Court reaffirmed
Virginia’s adherence to the principle of mutuality . . . .”).
156. See Bailey, 272 S.E.2d at 219–20.
157. See Weinberger, 510 F.3d at 491; Rawlings, 591 S.E.2d at 692; Angstadt v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co.,
457 S.E.2d 86, 87 (Va. 1995). Because all of these recent state supreme court cases involved the
attempted use of offensive issue preclusion, the court has not recently been directly confronted with
potentially applying preclusion defensively. Cf. Weinberger, 510 F.3d at 491; Rawlings, 591 S.E.2d at
692; Angstadt, 457 S.E.2d at 87. The court has not addressed many of the favorable arguments toward
allowing defensive preclusion while still forbidding offensive uses. See, e.g., Weinberger, 510 F.3d at
491; Rawlings, 591 S.E.2d at 692; Angstadt, 457 S.E.2d at 87. Nevertheless, these decisions make clear
that current Virginia law requires mutuality for the assertion of issue preclusion either defensively or
offensively. See, e.g., Weinberger, 510 F.3d at 491; Rawlings, 591 S.E.2d at 692; Angstadt, 457 S.E.2d
at 87.
158. See Bone, supra note 18, at 253.
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lawsuit should have an opportunity to relitigate an issue in a second
lawsuit.159 Privity involves a nonparty having been deemed to have
had an opportunity to litigate without actually having been named as
a party in a prior lawsuit.160 Privity often implicates constitutional
due process concerns. 161
Courts across jurisdictions have found privity between parties
without much scrutiny, and many courts have used the finding of
privity as a workaround to the mutuality requirement.162 As one court
stated: “Privity is essentially a shorthand statement that collateral
estoppel is to be applied in a given case; there is no universally
applicable definition of privity.”163
In the 2008 case Taylor v. Sturgell, the U.S. Supreme Court,
recognizing due process concerns, narrowed the definition of privity
by limiting privity’s application in preclusion cases to six specific
categories of relationships between parties. 164 The Court rejected the
“virtual representation” theory of privity that some lower courts had
used to expand the notion of privity. 165 In rejecting virtual
representation, the Court recognized that the lack of defined
categories had given lower courts broad discretion to apply privity,
which resulted in inconsistent decisions and erosion of due process

159. See supra Part I.
160. See Bone, supra note 18, at 226 n.120.
161. See id. at 236–37 & n.160.
162. See, e.g., Lynch v. Glass, 119 Cal. Rptr. 139, 141–42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); see also Hoffheimer,
supra note 6, at 524 (“To add to the confusion, a few opinions have formally approved of the need for
identity of parties in dictum yet permitted nonmutual collateral estoppel by making unnecessary findings
of privity.”).
163. Lynch, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 141–42 (citations omitted).
164. 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008). The Court held in Taylor that for a nonparty to a prior case to
assert preclusion in a second case under a privity theory, the party against whom preclusion is asserted
must either: (1) have agreed to be bound by the issues decided in the first case; (2) have a prior legal
relationship such as succeeding ownership of property; (3) have been “adequately represented” in the
first case (the Court gave the example of a class action); (4) have “assumed control” over the first case;
(5) have a formal representative relationship with the party in the first case such as an agency
relationship; or (6) be subject to certain statutes that ensure due process to the litigants. Id.
165. Id. at 895–901 (“Reaching beyond these six established categories, some lower courts have
recognized a ‘virtual representation’ exception to the rule against nonparty preclusion.”).
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protections.166 Before this decision, federal courts had essentially
permitted nonparty preclusion on an unpredictable, ad hoc basis.167
Although the Taylor decision now binds federal courts, state courts
continue to apply privity arbitrarily, and Georgia remains one of the
biggest culprits.168 The Georgia Supreme Court defined a privy as
“one who is represented at trial and who is in law so connected with a
party to the judgment as to have such an identity of interest that the
party to the judgment represented the same legal right.”169 However,
in the same case, the supreme court also said that “no definition of
‘privity’” can apply equally to all issue preclusion cases and that
“privity depends on the circumstances.”170
This loose definition, coupled with its circumstantial qualification,
results in problems similar to those in pre-Taylor federal courts:
inconsistent decisions and overly broad discretionary authority. 171
For instance, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a mother seeking
child support is not in privity with the child support agency also
seeking recovery of the same child support payments, even though
the agency “stands, to some degree, in the shoes of the party seeking
support.”172 A few years later, the same court found privity between
two people solely based on their similar interests “as residents and
voters” of the same county.173 One Georgia trial court explained the
current rules as essentially permitting preclusion whenever the

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See infra Section II.C.
169. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Gault, 627 S.E.2d 549, 551 (Ga. 2006) (quoting Butler v.
Turner, 555 S.E.2d 427, 430 (Ga. 2001)).
170. Id. (quoting Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, 7 F.3d 1464, 1468–69 (10th Cir. 1993)).
171. Id.; see also Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891–907.
172. Butler, 555 S.E.2d at 430 (“While in a support proceeding, the [Department of Human Resources
(DHR)] stands, to some degree, in the shoes of the party seeking support, it does not have a complete
identity of interest.” (citation omitted)); see also Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Fleeman, 439 S.E.2d 474, 475
(Ga. 1994) (“Because the child is not bound by the provisions of the divorce decree, collateral estoppel
does not bar DHR in its claim under O.C.G.A. § 19-11-6(a) insofar as DHR is pursuing that claim on the
child’s behalf.” (citations omitted)).
173. Lilly v. Heard, 761 S.E.2d 46, 50–51 (Ga. 2014).
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party-to-be-estopped appears “substantially similar” to a party in the
earlier lawsuit.174
Other cases further illustrate the reality that judges under a strict
mutuality regime often stretch the bounds of privity to alleviate the
burden of having to rehear the same issues.175 One court described
this dilemma bluntly: “We stand at a juncture, unwilling to embark in
an exercise of ‘metaphysical privity,’ yet faced with the
uncomforting thought that our prior decisions would possibly allow
appellants to litigate an identical issue against countless future
competitors without any res judicata or collateral estoppel effect.”176
Allowing nonmutual issue preclusion gives courts a tool to render
efficient judgments without wading into the murky waters of privity
law.
C. Georgia Supreme Court Decisions
Unlike other states’ highest courts, the Georgia Supreme Court has
not thoroughly addressed and analyzed the mutuality issue since the
Blonder-Tongue and Parklane cases changed federal law. 177 Instead,
every time the court hears an issue preclusion case, it simply restates

174. Plaintiff’s Response to Auto-Owners Ins. Co.’s Motion in Limine at *2–3, Dolan v. Air
Mechanix, LLC, No. STCV1003011, 2015 WL 13707576 (Ga. State Ct. Nov. 30, 2015) (“[C]ollateral
estoppel and/or res judicata should not apply here. . . . [I]f the parties in the declaratory judgment and
tort actions are not the same, or substantially similar in both actions, the doctrines do not apply.”).
175. See generally, e.g., Coffee Iron Works v. QORE, Inc., 744 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. 2013). In Coffee Iron
Works, the court held that issue preclusion prevented a stockholder of the prior-case plaintiff corporation
and bond guarantor of the prior-case plaintiff from relitigating issues. Id. at 118–19. The defendant
moved for summary judgment and argued that the plaintiffs’ privity with the plaintiffs in the prior case
should preclude this new lawsuit. Id. at 117. Of course, if Georgia allowed nonmutual defensive issue
preclusion, that would have been a clear winning argument for the defendants at the trial court level and
the second case likely would not have even been brought, much less appealed. See Hoffheimer, supra
note 6, at 573 (consolidating cases where courts “have reached the right result—rejecting mutuality in
fact—but they have done so by making unnecessary (and arguably erroneous) findings of privity”).
176. Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Felco Jewel Indus., Co., 336 N.W.2d 153, 158 (S.D. 1983).
177. See generally RUSKELL, supra note 88. As of November 16, 2020, WestLaw and LexisNexis
searches for all Georgia Supreme Court cases since Parklane had not revealed any case including a
discussion of the arguments for and against mutuality. The search results also indicated that the
Parklane decision had only been cited by the Georgia Supreme Court on one occasion, in a criminal
appeal, which was decided on other grounds. See Giddens v. State, 786 S.E.2d 659, 664 n.4 (Ga. 2016).
This case is discussed further infra.
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the traditional elements and enforces mutuality accordingly. 178 When
defining the issue preclusion rule, Georgia courts most often cite
Waldroup v. Greene County Hospital Authority, a 1995 Georgia
Supreme Court case.179 The Waldroup opinion clears up lower court
confusion regarding the distinctions between claim and issue
preclusion and lays out the elements of each defense, but the court’s
mutuality analysis ends there.180 The discussion instead focuses on
how to determine if an issue was actually litigated and decided. 181
In Norris v. Atlanta & West Point Railroad Co., the Georgia
Supreme Court enforced mutuality when it repudiated a troubling
new rule articulated by the court of appeals as the “doctrine of
binding precedent.”182 The lower court had essentially redefined the
concept of precedent by allowing a litigant to assert issue preclusion
against a nonparty to the prior lawsuit. 183 The Georgia Supreme
178. See generally, e.g., Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God v. Brinson, 696 S.E.2d 667 (Ga.
2010); Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 629 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ga. 2006); In re T.M.G., 570 S.E.2d
327 (Ga. 2002); Morrison v. Morrison, 663 S.E.2d 714, 718 (Ga. 2008); Brock v. Yale Mortg. Corp.,
700 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. 2010).
179. See, e.g., Copelan v. Copelan, 755 S.E.2d 739, 740 (Ga. 2014); In re T.M.G., 570 S.E.2 at 329;
Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Comput. Servs., 538 S.E.2d 746, 748 (Ga.
2000); Eichenblatt v. Piedmont/Maple, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 616, 620 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017); Dove v. Ty
Cobb Healthcare Sys., 729 S.E.2d 58, 61 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012); Carroll Anesthesia Assocs., P.C. v.
Anesthecare, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 829, 833 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). The cited passage—repeated in dozens of
lower court opinions—reads as follows:
Collateral estoppel precludes the re-adjudication of an issue that has previously been
litigated and adjudicated on the merits in another action between the same parties or
their privies. Like res judicata, collateral estoppel requires the identity of the parties
or their privies in both actions. However, unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel does
not require identity of the claim—so long as the issue was determined in the previous
action and there is identity of the parties, that issue may not be re-litigated, even as
part of a different claim. Furthermore, collateral estoppel only precludes those issues
that actually were litigated and decided in the previous action, or that necessarily had
to be decided in order for the previous judgment to have been rendered. Therefore,
collateral estoppel does not necessarily bar an action merely because the judgment in
the prior action was on the merits. Before collateral estoppel will bar consideration of
an issue, that issue must actually have been decided.
Waldroup v. Greene Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 463 S.E.2d 5, 7–8 (Ga. 1995) (footnotes omitted).
180. Waldroup, 463 S.E.2d at 7–8.
181. Id.
182. 333 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Ga. 1985) (“We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the
‘doctrine of binding precedent’ should be recognized in Georgia. We conclude that it should not.”).
183. Id. at 837 (“As used by the Court of Appeals the ‘doctrine’ is a species of collateral estoppel in
which no privity is required.”).
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Court reversed that decision and correctly noted that “due process
requires that the one who has not had his day in court will not be
barred by a prior adjudication.”184 The Norris court, however, did not
take the opportunity to address the less obvious questions presented
by issue preclusion assertions against a party who meets the
day-in-court prerequisite.185
Precisely such an opportunity presented itself more overtly in
Nally v. Bartow County Grand Jurors—a case whose factual
underpinnings offered perhaps the most justifiable vehicle for
mutuality reform.186 In that case, the Georgia Supreme Court
implicitly acknowledged the potential inefficiencies of the mutuality
requirement of issue preclusion while simultaneously reaffirming the
Waldroup rule that prohibits such preclusion. 187 In fact, the Nally
court arguably affirmed a holding on nonmutual defensive issue
preclusion grounds, albeit without saying so or declaring any new
precedential rule.188
In its appellate brief asserting a preclusion defense, the
defendant-appellee in Nally explicitly conceded that the parties in the
separate suits were not identical (i.e., there was no mutuality).189 The
Georgia Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the dismissals,
reasoning that “[i]t is axiomatic that the same issue cannot be

184. Id. at 838.
185. See id. at 837–38.
186. 633 S.E.2d 337 (Ga. 2006). The facts of the Nally case illustrate how Georgia’s mutuality rule
can squander judicial resources and incentivize repetitive, often-frivolous litigation. See id. at 338–39.
The plaintiff had filed three separate lawsuits seeking a declaration of his alleged right to present
arguments to a grand jury as a private citizen. Id. at 338. He brought the first suit in 2002 against the
district attorney; the second suit, in June 2005, against the Bartow County Grand Jury; and the third suit,
in September 2005, against each of the individual members of the grand jury. Id. at 338–39. The trial
court, relying on the prior dismissal on the merits of the 2002 suit, dismissed the two 2005 lawsuits on
preclusion grounds. Id. at 339. The plaintiff then appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. Id.
187. Id. at 339–40.
188. Id.
189. Brief of Appellees at 21, Nally, 633 S.E.2d 337 (No. S06A0487), 2005 GA S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
77, at *37 (“The Appellant has not enumerated any additional facts or legal premise which would
preclude the application of res judicata or estoppel by judg[]ment. While the member[s] of the panel
were not specifically named as parties in [the prior case], the Appellant seeks the very same legal result.
While the dance partners may be different, the same song plays on.”).
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relitigated ad infinitum.”190 In the very same paragraph, the court
perplexingly explained its holding by quoting the prior case law,
reaffirming that “[c]ollateral estoppel, like res judicata, requires
identity of parties or privity.”191 However, the short opinion included
no analysis of whether any of the defendants were in privity with one
another.192 The court instead justified its ruling on the basis that the
adjudication of the issue had been “conclusively established” in the
first lawsuit.193 The court concluded that “the trial court correctly
dismissed the complaint wherein [the plaintiff] had raised the
identical claim for the third time.”194 Perhaps the justices felt no
pressure to address mutuality in this case because the pro se
plaintiff-appellant did not argue the point in his “handwritten
motion” or briefs.195 The Nally case remains a uniquely frustrating
oddity in Georgia issue preclusion jurisprudence, and lower courts
have not cited it as authority to apply nonmutual preclusion in other
cases.
In Brock v. Yale Mortgage Corp., the Georgia Supreme Court
addressed a party’s attempted assertion of nonmutual preclusion in a
two-sentence footnote, simply stating that issue preclusion could not
apply because the party asserting it “was neither a party nor in privity
with a party in the divorce proceedings.”196 The court reflexively

190. Nally, 633 S.E.2d at 339 (quoting Johnson v. State, 612 S.E.2d 29, 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)).
191. Id. at 339 (quoting Hardwick v. Williams, 613 S.E.2d 215 (Ga. 2005)).
192. See id. at 339–40.
193. Id. at 339.
194. Id.
195. Id. (“However, his handwritten motion contained in the record does not state any specific
grounds . . . .”).
196. 700 S.E.2d 583, 589 n.5 (Ga. 2010) (citing Waldroup v. Greene Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 463 S.E.2d 5
(Ga. 1995)). In the footnote, the court declined to further consider the defendant-appellee’s attempted
assertion beyond simply stating the following:
Yale argues for the first time on appeal that Brock is collaterally estopped by the final
judgment in the divorce proceedings from litigating whether Yale’s security interest
attaches to the entire property. Pretermitting its procedural default, collateral estoppel
is inapplicable since Yale was neither a party nor in privity with a party in the divorce
proceedings.
Id.
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cited Waldroup and ended its analysis without any mention of the
recent evolution of preclusion law. 197
The closest thing to an analysis of nonmutual issue preclusion in
the Georgia Supreme Court’s published decisions also came in a
footnote—in dicta—to a criminal appeal. 198 Without reference to the
relevant Georgia case law, Justice Nahmias cited Parklane for the
proposition that “collateral estoppel can apply both offensively and
defensively in the civil context.”199 Justice Nahmias’s footnote then
cited cases from other jurisdictions regarding the application of
offensive issue preclusion in criminal cases. 200 Notably, the court did
not cite any of its own precedent regarding mutuality but rather
focused on the constitutional applications of issue preclusion in the
criminal context.201 However, that dicta has not had any precedential
value; lower courts continue to be bound by traditional issue
preclusion elements in civil cases.202
D. Lower Courts in Georgia
Lower appellate and even trial courts in Georgia have recognized
the potential absurdities of strict mutuality and have attempted to
persuade the state supreme court justices to change the law.203 These
attempts have been unsuccessful. 204 To the extent the Georgia
Supreme Court has heard those cases on appeal, it has not followed
or even analyzed the reasoning. 205

197. Id.
198. Giddens v. State, 786 S.E.2d 659, 664 n.4 (Ga. 2016).
199. Id. (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333–38 (1979)). The holding of the case
ultimately does not disrupt the elements of issue preclusion under Georgia law. Id.
200. Id. (“[M]ost courts have refused to apply collateral estoppel offensively against the defendant in
criminal cases.” (first citing State v. Scarbrough, 181 S.W.3d 650, 655–57 (Tenn. 2005); and then citing
United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 890–98 (3d Cir. 1994))).
201. See id.
202. See RUSKELL, supra note 88.
203. See, e.g., Wickliffe I, 489 S.E.2d 153, 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, No. S97C1859,
1998 Ga. LEXIS 185 (Ga. Jan. 5, 1998).
204. See, e.g., Wickliffe Co. v. Wickliffe (Wickliffe II), No. S97C1859, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 185, at *185
(Ga. Jan. 5, 1998).
205. See discussion supra Section II.C.
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1. Evolution of Mutuality Law in the Georgia Court of Appeals
Some courts initially tried to adopt the modern view of allowing
nonmutual preclusion.206 From 1984 to 1993, Georgia appellate
courts began allowing litigants to assert issue preclusion even if they
had not been parties to the first lawsuit that decided the issue.207 This
line of cases originated with the Georgia Court of Appeals case Watts
v. Lippitt.208 In a short opinion, the Watts court allowed the defendant
to prevail on an issue preclusion defense “even though, strictly
speaking, [the defendant] was not in privity with the defendants in
[the prior] action.”209 The court cited the American Jurisprudence
encyclopedia and federal cases as persuasive authority in its decision
to adopt the “modern trend” of nonmutual issue preclusion. 210
Following that decision, other Georgia courts quoted that language
and allowed litigants to assert issue preclusion both defensively and

206. See Wickliffe I, 489 S.E.2d at 155–56 (acknowledging a line of cases adopting the modern trend).
207. See Ervin v. Swift Adhesives, Inc., 430 S.E.2d 133, 134–35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming
summary judgment for a chemical manufacturer defendant based on the defendant’s assertion of
nonmutual defensive issue preclusion because the defendant’s liability had already been decided in the
plaintiff’s prior workers’ compensation claim against her employer); Wilson v. Malcolm T. Gilliland,
402 S.E.2d 291, 293–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing nonmutual offensive issue preclusion); see also
Winters v. Pund, 346 S.E.2d 124, 127 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (“[I]n modern legal practice, the central issue
in determining whether the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply is whether the party
against whom the plea is raised has had full opportunity to litigate the issues.” (citing Watts v. Lippitt,
320 S.E.2d 581, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984))).
208. 320 S.E.2d at 582–83; see also Ervin, 430 S.E.2d at 134 (quoting Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 582–83);
Wilson, 402 S.E.2d at 293 (same); Winters, 346 S.E.2d at 127 (citing Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 583).
209. Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 582–83. Watts arguably stood for an even broader application of issue
preclusion than allowed in other jurisdictions because the issue of the defendant’s liability was decided
by a release that plaintiffs executed related to settlement of their first lawsuit. Id.; see also MOORE ET
AL., supra note 7, § 132.03 (“As a general rule, a fact established in prior litigation not by judicial
resolution but by stipulation has not been actually litigated and therefore . . . is not deemed to be
‘actually litigated . . . .’”). The plaintiffs in Watts were barred from bringing a subsequent medical
malpractice claim against a physician who treated the plaintiff for an injury after a car crash because the
executed release signed with the other driver—the defendant in the first action—prevented the plaintiffs
from holding any other person or entity liable for any injury that may have been related to the crash.
Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 582. The court explained that the plaintiffs had an opportunity to name the
physician as a defendant in the first lawsuit, and therefore, “the plaintiffs have had a full and complete
opportunity to litigate the applicability of the release [to the physician].” Id. at 583.
210. Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 583. The court cited 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments §§ 522, 523 (2020), and
Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., 517 F.2d 117, 122–23 (5th Cir. 1975), to apply
the “modern trend.” Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 583.
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offensively.211 However, during the same time period, other Georgia
appellate courts continued to apply strict mutuality. 212
The Georgia Court of Appeals resolved this discrepancy—in a
nine-judge opinion without dissent—in the 1997 case Wickliffe v.
Wickliffe Co.213 The court found that the facts satisfied all other
elements of issue preclusion, and the case necessarily turned on
which mutuality doctrine applied. 214 To their credit, and unlike the
Georgia Supreme Court, the judges addressed arguments in favor of
adopting a nonmutuality standard. 215 The court also acknowledged
the “modern trend,” cited the Second Restatement of Judgments, and
actually opined that “the modern trend regarding mutuality is perhaps
the better position.”216 Ultimately, however, the Wickliffe court held
that it was bound to follow the Georgia Supreme Court, and under
that precedent, issue preclusion required identity of parties or
211. See Ervin, 430 S.E.2d at 134 (quoting Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 582–83); Wilson, 402 S.E.2d at 293
(same); Winters, 346 S.E.2d at 127 (citing Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 583). The full rule as stated by the Watts
court read:
The modern trend in applying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel is to
confine the privity requirement to the party against whom the plea is asserted, so as to
permit one who is not a party to the judgment to assert the judgment against a party
who is bound by it, and thus to preclude relitigation by that party of issues which
have been determined adversely to him in the prior action, even though if the issue
had been decided in his favor in the prior action, he would not have been entitled to
assert the prior adjudication in a subsequent action against a stranger to the judgment.
The central question in determining whether the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel apply is whether the party against whom the plea is raised has had
a full opportunity to litigate the issue in question.
Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 582–83 (citations omitted).
212. See Toporek v. Zepp, 479 S.E.2d 759, 760 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (acknowledging that “in Watts
we held that the privity requirement of collateral estoppel is confined to the party against whom the plea
is asserted” but noting that “[t]his Court is bound by [Georgia Supreme Court holdings]” (citations
omitted)); Miller v. Steelmaster Material Handling Corp., 478 S.E.2d 601, 603–04 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
(declining to allow nonmutual preclusion and instead engaging in a privity analysis); Stiltjes v. Ridco
Exterminating Co., 399 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1990) (same).
213. 489 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, No. S97C1859, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 185
(Ga. Jan. 5, 1998).
214. Id. (“The underlying question[,] upon which this case turns, is whether the mutual identity of the
parties is required for collateral estoppel.”).
215. See id. at 155–56. “The current rule allows parties to relitigate issues they have already litigated
and lost, straining judicial resources and creating the possibility of inconsistent results.” Id. at 156.
216. Id. at 155–56 (first quoting Ervin, 430 S.E.2d at 134; then citing Watts, 320 S.E.2d at 582–83;
then citing Winters, 346 S.E.2d at 127; then citing Wilson, 402 S.E.2d at 293; and then citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. L. INST. 1982)).
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privies—even though, as discussed supra, “the Supreme Court cases
did not in fact turn on the identity of parties element.”217 In doing so,
Wickliffe explicitly overruled the line of cases applying nonmutual
preclusion.218 The Georgia Court of Appeals continued, however, to
directly ask the Georgia Supreme Court “to embrace the modern
trend when it does directly address this issue.”219 Despite this
unanimous opinion by the lower court, the Georgia Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 220 More than a decade later, the court has yet to
“directly address this issue.”221
A few years after Wickliffe, one lower court attempted to
distinguish the precedent by redefining and expanding the meaning
of “party” in the context of the “identity of parties” element.222 In
Edmondson v. Gilmore, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a
litigant who was “not technically” a party to the first action may
nevertheless preclude an issue decided in the first case because the
217. Id. at 156 (“[W]e are constrained to follow the Supreme Court and require that collateral
estoppel requires identity of parties.”); see also discussion supra Section II.C.
218. Id. (“Our decision necessitates that we overrule Ervin, [430 S.E.2d 133]; Watts, [320 S.E.2d
581]; Winters, [346 S.E.2d 124]; and Wilson, [402 S.E.2d 291].”). The court uses the term “overrule.”
Id. Although an appellate court generally cannot overrule itself, nine judges concurred in the Wickliffe
decision, and no judges dissented. Id. at 157. Under Georgia Court of Appeals rules, “[p]rior decisions
of the Court may be overruled by a single division of the Court after consultation with the other
nondisqualified judges on the Court, provided the decision of the division is unanimous.” GA. CT. APP.
R. 33(a); see also Austin Martin Williams, Researching Georgia Law (2015 Edition), 31 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 741, 746–47 (2015) (“A judgment concurred in by all the judges in a division will be binding on
all other divisions. However, when the Court of Appeals sits as two divisions and a seventh judge, that
court can overrule by majority concurrence a previous decision of one division. Moreover, a majority
concurrence by the entire court will take precedent over any decision by a single division.” (footnotes
omitted)).
219. Wickliffe I, 489 S.E.2d at 156. The court commented:
We encourage the Supreme Court to embrace the modern trend when it does directly
address this issue. The current rule allows parties to relitigate issues they have already
litigated and lost, straining judicial resources and creating the possibility of
inconsistent results. Moreover, the Supreme Court has cited sections of the Second
Restatement of Judgments dealing with collateral estoppel approvingly, . . . and the
Second Restatement does not require mutuality before parties may be precluded from
relitigating an issue they have already litigated and lost.
Id. (citations omitted).
220. Wickliffe II, No. S97C1859, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 185, at *185 (Jan. 5, 1998) (“The Supreme Court
today denied the petition for certiorari in this case.”).
221. Wickliffe I, 489 S.E.2d at 156; see also discussion supra Section II.C.
222. See Edmondson v. Gilmore, 554 S.E.2d 742, 745 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), vacated, 583 S.E.2d 172
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss2/8

42

Gautier: Reluctance Or Apathy?

2021]

RELUCTANCE OR APATHY?

583

litigant had an opportunity to intervene in the earlier suit and had an
interest in the outcome of the case. 223 The Georgia Supreme Court
reversed and again unquestioningly upheld Georgia’s mutuality
doctrine.224 The state supreme court reasoned that the two cases did
not meet the identity of parties element due to lack of privity; the
party asserting issue preclusion did not share the same legal right as
the party in the previous case. 225
2. Georgia Trial Courts
The mutuality requirement also continues to befuddle some of
Georgia’s trial courts. In 2014, one state court mistakenly held that
“[t]he fact that the former and instant actions involve different
plaintiffs does not bar application of issue preclusion in this case.”226
After the losing party pointed out the error, the court had to release a
new opinion reversing its ruling and applying mutuality.227 In her
revised order, the trial judge commented that the state’s current strict
mutuality rule “strains judicial resources” and “creates the possibility
of inconsistent results” but that she was nevertheless bound by
Georgia Supreme Court precedent.228

223. Id. (“We ascertain whether a person is a party ‘exclusively by inspection of the record.’ In so
doing, we look for the existence of an adversarial relationship.” (footnotes omitted)). Additionally, the
court said that “[t]he term ‘party’ to an action includes all who are directly interested in the subject
matter, and who have a right to make defense, control the pleadings, examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and appeal from the judgment.” Id. (quoting State Bar of Ga. v. Beazley, 350 S.E.2d 422, 425
(Ga. 1986)).
224. In re T.M.G., 570 S.E.2d 327, 329 (Ga. 2002) (“The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that
the [two lawsuits] involved identical parties or their privies.”). This case involved a sensitive child
custody matter, and the court’s reversal may have been partially motivated by the emotional factors. See
id. at 328. Indeed, the Court of Appeals opinion noted the “irony of resolving so emotional a dispute on
such a technical basis” and “the pain this decision will bring to the [losing party’s] family.” Edmondson,
554 S.E.2d at 746.
225. See In re T.M.G., 570 S.E.2d at 329–330.
226. Sadek v. Chowdhury (Sadek I), No. 13-C-07596-S5, 2014 WL 8764962, at *1 (Ga. State Ct.
Dec. 4, 2014) (citation omitted), vacated, No. 13-C-07596-S5, 2015 WL 1973284 (Ga. State Ct. Jan. 12,
2015).
227. Sadek v. Chowdhury (Sadek II), No. 13-C-07596-S5, 2015 WL 1973284, at *1 (Ga. State Ct.
Jan. 12, 2015).
228. Id.
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Other Georgia trial courts have similarly recognized the policy
arguments favoring nonmutuality. 229 In one case, the judge noted
how “[j]udicial resources would indeed be conserved by not
re-litigating this issue which has obviously been vigorously litigated
and carefully considered by [the previous judge in the prior case].”230
Although binding precedent forced the judge to apply mutuality, the
judge strongly encouraged the defendant to appeal the decision and
attempt to change the law, even telling the losing defendant that “the
Court is inclined to grant a certificate of immediate review of this
decision if requested.”231 The defendant, however, did not file an
appeal, and the lack of subsequent appellate history suggests that the
parties may have instead settled the case. 232
E. Missed Opportunities by Georgia Litigants
Given established Georgia law, many litigants have failed to assert
an issue preclusion defense and preserve it for appeal. Yet, many
cases would have been excellent vehicles for advocating for a change
in this Georgia common law rule.233 Examining certain additional
Georgia Supreme Court cases will illustrate the missed opportunities
for Georgia litigants and practitioners—cases where counsel for one
party could have attempted to argue for a change in Georgia
preclusion law.
Miller v. Clayton County presented an opportunity for the
plaintiffs’ counsel to argue for nonmutual offensive issue

229. See, e.g., Interfinancial Midtown Inc. v. Troutman Sanders, LLP, No. 2005CV102995, 2006 WL
4660190 (Ga. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2006).
230. Id.
231. Id. (“Despite all the valid reasons for granting [d]efendants’ motion, under the currently existing
Georgia law of collateral estoppel, the Court finds the motion must be [denied]. The facts of the instant
case might present an opportunity for the appellate courts to re-examine the law of collateral estoppel in
Georgia. With that in mind, and with the knowledge that undoubtedly much time and expense will be
invested in preparing to prosecute and defend [p]laintiff’s [c]ount II in the instant litigation, the Court is
inclined to grant a certificate of immediate review of this decision if requested.”).
232. See id.
233. See generally Coen v. CDC Software Corp., 816 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. 2018); Miller v. Clayton Cnty.,
518 S.E.2d 402 (Ga. 1999).
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preclusion.234 The dispute centered on whether the plaintiffs, who
were court reporters for Clayton County, qualified for certain
additional retirement benefits under the county’s compensation
plan.235 A separate court reporter-plaintiff had won a lawsuit against
the same defendant on the exact same issue a few years prior and
received the additional benefits. 236
The plaintiffs’ briefs to the court in Miller repeatedly mentioned
this earlier case and argued that the issue had already been analyzed
and decided.237 The briefs laid a foundation for an issue preclusion
argument but never actually mentioned the possibility of issue
preclusion or cited any related case law or other authority. 238 The
appellees’ reply brief recognized the potential issue preclusion
problem and even commented that the earlier case “admittedly
raise[d] similar issues,” but then it correctly noted the inapplicability
of issue preclusion under current Georgia law due to lack of
mutuality.239 Per the facts as stated in the briefs, the case would likely
234. See generally Supplementary Brief of Appellants, Miller, 518 S.E.2d 402 (No. S99A0297), 1999
WL 33737053.
235. See Miller, 518 S.E.2d at 135–36.
236. Brief of Appellants at 12, Miller, 518 S.E.2d 402 (No. S99A0297), 1998 WL 34187903, at *12
(“In an identical case involving the Clayton County Pension Board (a party to this action), by a Clayton
County court reporter (identical to the appellants here), the lower court ruled [in favor of the court
reporter].”); see also Supplementary Brief of Appellants, supra note 234, at 2 (“[W]hen the facts are
clear, the undisputed fact, as found by Judge Simmons in the companion case, is that
[plaintiff-appellants] are, indeed, full-time . . . employees and are entitled to all of the benefits . . . .”).
237. Brief of Appellants, supra note 236, at 12 (“In the [earlier] case, no appeal was ever prosecuted
by the county, and it remains the law of that case and serves as authority for this Court to correct the
trial court here so that [appellants] will also be in the same classification as [the plaintiff in the earlier
case] . . . .”); Supplementary Brief of Appellants, supra note 234, at 1–7. The supplemental brief
essentially begs the court to defer to the prior decision on the issue because the judge in that case
“took . . . into account” all of the same facts and evidence, “addressed it all,” and determined that the
plaintiff in that case “was a covered county employee under the Plan.” Supplementary Brief of
Appellants, supra note 234, at 6.
238. Brief of Appellants, supra note 236, at 15 (“This question was squarely before Judge Simmons
when he ruled in the [first] case, and his Order, both the original and on the Motion for Reconsideration,
eloquently display[ed] the sound reasoning for this additional compensation . . . .”); Supplementary
Brief of Appellants, supra note 234, at 1–7.
239. Brief of Appellees at 14–16, Miller, 518 S.E.2d 402 (No. S99A0297), 1999 WL 33737050, at
*14–16. The appellees’ brief noted that the appellant “relie[d] almost exclusively” on the earlier case
and that the earlier case “admittedly raise[d] similar issues to those in the case at bar.” Id. at 14. The
appellees then argued that the prior case “does not bind this Court in any regard, nor did it bind the trial
court.” Id. In addition to similarly dismissing potential claim preclusion arguments, the appellees noted
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have met all of the Parklane fairness factors for the application of
nonmutual offensive preclusion. 240 The plaintiffs’ attorneys could
have urged the court to adopt the federal mutuality doctrine.241 The
plaintiff-appellants instead lost the case. 242
The litigants in Coen v. CDC Software Corp. also had a chance to
argue for a change in preclusion law.243 However, the briefs from
both the appellant and the appellee instead argued whether or not
privity existed between the parties in the first and second lawsuits.244
The court’s opinion centered on a lengthy analysis of the “same
causes of action” element of res judicata. 245 Based on the underlying
facts, the appellee may have been able to prevail on an issue
preclusion argument if he had argued for a change in the law.246
Other litigants similarly tried, with some success, to expand the
definition of privity to comply with the mutuality requirement. 247
III. PROPOSAL
Georgia should consider following the national trend and allow
nonmutual defensive applications of issue preclusion. Georgia can

that “[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel . . . applies only to issues that were actually decided in a
previous suit, featuring the same parties.” Id. at 15 (citation omitted). Here, the appellees continued,
“[T]he parties to the case at bar are different from those in [the prior case;] the [prior case] cannot
preclude this Court’s review of any issues presented in the case at bar.” Id. at 16.
240. Supplementary Brief of Appellants, supra note 234, at 1–7; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331–33 (1979). If this case had been decided under federal law and had plaintiffs’
counsel asserted issue preclusion, the plaintiffs likely would have prevailed. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at
331–33.
241. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331–33.
242. Miller, 518 S.E.2d at 402 (“Because we find no error in the trial court’s determination that for
the purpose of these additional sums appellants are not employees under the County’s pension
ordinance, we affirm.”).
243. 816 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. 2018).
244. Brief of Appellant Timothy F. Coen at 16–17, Coen, 816 S.E.2d 670 (No. S17G1375), 2017 WL
4221659, at *16–17. (“Here, there was no identity of the parties in the [c]ontract [c]ase and [t]ort [c]ase
because the individual defendants named in the later [t]ort [c]ase were not in privity . . . .”); see also
Brief of Appellees at 28–30, Coen, 816 S.E.2d 670 (No. S17G1375), 2017 WL 10128220, at *28–30.
245. See Coen, 816 S.E.2d at 673–76.
246. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331–33.
247. See generally, e.g., Appellee’s Brief in Response to the Brief of Appellants, Lilly v. Heard, 761
S.E.2d 46 (Ga. 2014) (No. S14A0433), 2013 WL 7018442.
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recognize nonmutual defensive preclusion without necessarily
allowing the offensive assertion of issue preclusion.248 The latter
doctrine remains controversial and could lead to additional litigation
and confusion among lower state courts.249 In contrast, policy
justifications strongly support nonmutual defensive issue
preclusion.250 The traditional policy arguments have heightened
salience in Georgia in light of recent economic incentives aimed at
attracting new business to the state; this proposed reform is consistent
with those goals.251
The need for change is particularly important for litigators and the
state judiciary. In addition to alleviating crowded dockets and
promoting judicial efficiency, broadening the scope of issue
preclusion would lead to greater clarity and predictability in the law.
Continued adherence to strict mutuality in Georgia has led to
ever-expanding definitions of privity as courts in some cases
recognize the absurdity of relitigating identical issues but remain
bound to follow elements of issue preclusion as repeated by the
Georgia Supreme Court.252 These situations can also lead courts to
grapple with challenging constitutional due process issues that could
be avoided by the adoption of a common law doctrine emphatically
endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court and enshrined in federal court
jurisprudence.253 Conformity with the national consensus would also
facilitate the duties of federal judges sitting in diversity, who are
bound to follow state preclusion law, as well as out-of-state
practitioners, who may not be familiar with the current particularities
248. See Schopler, supra note 17, § 4(c) (“[C]ourts are more inclined to permit the defensive, than the
offensive, use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.”).
249. See discussion supra Section I.A.1.
250. See supra Section II.A.
251. See Matt Weeks, Georgia Economy Still Riding Expansion Wave into 2019, UGA TODAY (Dec.
6, 2018), https://news.uga.edu/economic-outlook-2019/ [https://perma.cc/3DT8-D8J9]; Pro-Business
Environment, supra note 22.
252. See supra Section II.B.
253. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705 (2011) (recognizing that courts generally prefer
avoiding constitutional issues if possible). The Court commented: “a ‘longstanding principle of judicial
restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of
deciding them.’” Id. (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445
(1988)).
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of Georgia law.254 Similarly, implementing consistent mutuality
doctrines across jurisdictions would benefit multijurisdictional
litigators by allowing for greater predictability of future judgments.
The most natural solution for reforming Georgia mutuality law lies
with convincing the Georgia Supreme Court to (1) take up the issue
and assess its merits, and (2) change the elements of common law
issue preclusion to allow nonmutual defensive assertion. Practitioners
advocating for this judicial change in the law must remain cognizant
of both the procedural hurdles and the policy arguments for reform.
As an alternative solution, the state legislature may enact this
proposed reform via statute by codifying nonmutual defensive issue
preclusion as part of the state’s Civil Practice Act.
A. Georgia-Specific Policy Considerations
Georgia’s rapid population growth and increasingly crowded court
dockets amplify the policy advantages of allowing nonmutual
defensive issue preclusion. 255 Broadening the preclusion rule also
fosters economic growth by reducing the costs of duplicative
litigation.256 Additionally, Georgia’s current doctrine—at odds with
the vast majority of other states and jurisdictions—reduces
predictability and creates unnecessary confusion for practitioners and
judges.257
1. Judicial Efficiency
Georgia courts increasingly face the problems of crowded civil
dockets and lengthy delays in trial and hearing calendars, especially

254. See supra Section I.A.2; see also Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497,
508–09 (2001).
255. Michael E. Kanell, Georgia Population Grew by 110,973 in a Year—7th Largest in the U.S.,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/business/georgia-population-grew-110-973year-7th-largest/t4BpHTNVAwPoc08Xr60ajJ/ [https://perma.cc/9SXF-2AXA] (“Americans are
increasingly on the move and a lot of them are coming to Georgia.”).
256. MOORE ET AL., supra note 7, § 132.01 ¶ 3.
257. See Erichson, supra note 8, at 966.
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in light of recent reductions to court budgets.258 Crowded dockets and
litigation delays result in overworked judges, stymied access to
justice, and increased costs to both plaintiffs and defendants. 259
Georgia’s ongoing population growth will likely perpetuate these
problems in the coming years.260
Nonmutual defensive issue preclusion provides for quick
adjudication of cases when case-dispositive issues, such as
negligence or liability, have been previously litigated and decided.261
Even when an already-decided issue is not case-dispositive, its
preclusion allows the court to preserve valuable time and resources
that would have been spent hearing arguments on duplicative
motions, briefs, or presentations of facts at trial. 262 This increased
efficiency also promotes the right to speedy trials and increases
access to justice by allowing other pending cases to move to trial
more quickly.263

258. W. Anthony Jenkins, Judicial Crossroads: The Journey Toward Judicial Reform, MICH. BAR J.,
Mar. 2011, at 14, 15 (recognizing that Georgia faces “devastating budget cuts to its state court system”).
The recent COVID-19 pandemic—ongoing at the time of this Note’s publication—will likely amplify
these problems, especially as courts begin tackling the growing backlog of cases. See Lindsey B. Mann
& Alison A. Grounds, Response to COVID-19: Litigation Impacts and Resources in Georgia,
TROUTMAN PEPPER: ARTICLES & PUBL’NS (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.troutman.com/insights/responseto-covid-19-litigation-impacts-and-resources-in-georgia.html [https://perma.cc/5HAV-6FP3].
259. FULTON CNTY. SUPER. CT., BUSINESS COURT: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2014),
https://www.fultoncourt.org/business/Business_Court_2014_Annual_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NV93-STU5] (“Court delays not only increase costs for all litigants, but can negatively
impact Georgia’s economy.” (citing THE WASH. ECON. GRP., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON THE
GEORGIA ECONOMY OF DELAYS IN GEORGIA’S STATE COURTS DUE TO RECENT REDUCTIONS IN
FUNDING FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2011))). Of course, issue preclusion reform alone cannot cure
these larger problems, but judges and litigants would surely appreciate any potentially increased
expeditiousness in resolving their disputes.
260. Kanell, supra note 255.
261. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464. This adjudication often occurs via summary
judgment motion. Id.
262. Id.
263. See Maryland ex rel. Gliedman v. Cap. Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 304 (D. Md. 1967). In
reaching its finding allowing nonmutual preclusion, the court explained its rationale:
[T]he court has taken into account not only the right of society to have its courts
render justice as inexpensively as possible and the right of each litigant to have his
day in court, but also the rights of other litigants who might have to wait to have their
day in court because one litigant is allowed to litigate the same issue over and over
again.
Id.
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2. Economic Growth and Industry Protectionism
Georgia policy makers repeatedly state their intentions of
improving the state’s economy by attracting new industry, reducing
regulations, and promoting growth. 264 Economists have found that
efficiency-focused court reform efforts positively affect economic
growth and business development. 265 In contrast, delays in the
judicial system can lead to lower wages, lower revenue, and stymied
economic output.266
Nonmutual defensive issue preclusion would protect Georgia
industry and business interests without any significant adverse impact
on the rights of injured plaintiffs.267 Small businesses, corporations,
and other employers are more likely to be defendants in civil suits.268
Allowing these defendants to assert issue preclusion when the
plaintiff’s grievance has already been adjudicated would reduce their
litigation costs.269 Companies may presumably then choose to

264. Pro-Business Environment, supra note 22.
265. See Jenkins, supra note 258, at 15. The findings of the State Bar of Georgia study included that
“[t]he court system in Georgia is a key economic development foundation of the state . . . [and] efficient
dispositions . . . [of lawsuits] impact Georgia’s business and social climates.” Id.
266. Id. (“Court delays due to lack of proper funding represent a ‘dead weight’ cost to the economy in
terms of lost economic output, labor income, and fiscal revenues. Those delays also adversely impact
other nonquantifiable measures of socioeconomic well being.”). The State Bar study also concluded that
“the economic impact of judicial underfunding in Georgia is between $337 million and $802 million.”
Id.
267. See supra Part II. For a counterargument, see Note, Exposing the Extortion Gap: An Economic
Analysis of the Rules of Collateral Estoppel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1940 (1992) (arguing that either a
return to mutuality or, alternatively, allowing assertions of issue preclusion against a nonparty to the
prior suit would yield the most economically efficient dispositions).
268. See supra Part II.
269. Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971) (“To the extent
the defendant in the second suit may not win by asserting [issue preclusion], . . . the defendant’s time
and money are diverted from alternative uses—productive or otherwise—to relitigation of a decided
issue.”). The United States has the highest costs of litigation per capita in the developed world;
disavowing the antiquated mutuality standard would reduce those costs in Georgia. U.S. Legal System Is
World’s Most Costly According to a New Study, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (May 14,
2013),
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/us-legal-system-is-worlds-most-costlyaccording-to-a-new-study [https://perma.cc/EF3R-PYM4] (“Data shows that, as a percentage of its
economy, the U.S. legal system costs over 150 percent more than the Eurozone average, and over 50
percent more than the United Kingdom.”).
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allocate their resources towards more productive ends such as
increased hiring or greater innovation.270
3. Predictability and Cross-Jurisdictional Consistency
Scholars generally agree that predictability “is a defining feature of
the rule of law.”271 Businesses also value predictability in the law
because it serves to reduce compliance costs and ensure accurate
financial planning, among other reasons.272 Attorneys and advisors
need clear and predictable procedural rules to effectively counsel
clients and make appropriate strategic litigation decisions. 273 Strict
mutuality undermines the rule of law because it can result in
inconsistent verdicts on the same exact issue when the issue is
subject to repeated litigation in various forums or by different
attorneys.274 These inconsistent verdicts severely impact the ability of
attorneys to properly advise clients and the ability of businesses to
predict litigation outcomes and make financial decisions
accordingly.275

270. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 328 (“To the extent the defendant in the second suit may not win
by asserting [issue preclusion], . . . the defendant’s time and money are diverted from alternative uses—
productive or otherwise—to relitigation of a decided issue.”).
271. Kem Thompson Frost, Predictability in the Law, Prized Yet Not Promoted: A Study in Judicial
Priorities, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 48, 51 (2015). “Achieving predictability of outcomes within a
jurisdiction and uniformity in the law across parallel jurisdictions helps assure consistency in judicial
decisions, giving people a greater sense of certainty in the way courts will resolve disputes.” Id.; see
also, e.g., Marcin Matczak, Why Judicial Formalism Is Incompatible with the Rule of Law, 31 CAN. J.L.
& JURIS. 61, 63 (2018) (noting that “one of the main tenets of the rule of law [is] the predictability of
court verdicts”).
272. Byassesse, supra note 104, at 1426 (“[P]reclusion promotes public confidence in the legal
system and permits interested parties to predict and plan future affairs based on the results obtained in a
prior lawsuit. Knowing that subsequent litigation will not supersede these results, litigants may depend
upon the rights and liabilities established previously in planning their future financial needs or business
decisions.” (footnotes omitted)). See generally Howard H. Stevenson & Milhnea C. Moldoveanu, The
Power of Predictability, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1995, at 140, https://hbr.org/1995/07/the-powerof-predictability [https://perma.cc/49JM-S6HZ].
273. Erichson, supra note 8, at 1013–14 (“Particularly in areas in which predictability matters, such as
when litigators must make strategic decisions based on the anticipated effect of a judgment, we should
prefer a simple rule to a more intricate or indeterminate one.”).
274. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text (discussing the “gaming table” concerns with
the mutuality requirement).
275. See Erichson, supra note 8, at 1013–14.

Published by Reading Room, 2021

51

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 8

592

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:2

Georgia’s continued adherence to a minority rule—at most, only
six other states follow a similar strict mutuality doctrine—also
lessens predictability of litigation outcomes on a more macro level by
causing confusion and often unnecessary appeals, especially in
multijurisdictional litigation.276 When the first suit and the second
suit were brought in separate jurisdictions, Georgia’s incongruous
doctrine forces courts to grapple with complex conflict of law and
choice of law problems.277 The increase in class actions, mass torts,
and other multiforum litigation highlights the need for Georgia to
change its law and conform with near-universally accepted mutuality
rules.278 As one scholar aptly described it, “Excessive procedural
debate only tends to make courts burdened, lawyers rich, and
everybody else confused.”279
Indeed, lawyers and even judges have confused choice of law
doctrines and incorrectly applied the wrong jurisdiction’s issue
preclusion law.280 In most cases, citing another state’s law (or federal
law) regarding mutuality essentially amounts to a harmless error
because most states allow nonmutual issue preclusion with similar
requirements.281 When Georgia litigants mistakenly proceed under
that assumption, however, the misunderstanding can have severe
consequences and result in unpredictable judgments.282
276. Id. at 966 (“A number of states cling to the traditional mutuality requirement. Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Virginia require mutuality.” (footnotes omitted)).
277. Id at 1016.
278. Id. at 1015 (“The need for a clear, reliable rule of interjurisdictional preclusion has grown with
the phenomenal growth of multiparty, multiforum litigation. The unpredictability of choice of preclusion
law and the tendency of many courts unthinkingly to apply their own preclusion law to other courts’
judgments highlight the need for a clear rule.”).
279. Id. at 1013.
280. Id. at 1015 (“[M]any courts unthinkingly [] apply their own preclusion law to other courts’
judgments”). See generally QOS Networks Ltd. v. Warburg Pincus & Co., No. 02-1-5305-34, 2006 WL
4513580 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2006) (applying Georgia issue preclusion law without discussion of
choice of law doctrines when the first lawsuit was adjudicated by a New York court).
281. See, e.g., Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1272 n.20 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that
prior cases “did not reach the question of which law to apply, because both Georgia and federal law
required ‘the actual litigation of the issue in question in the prior proceeding,’ which was dispositive of
the issue” (quoting Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1998))). “Of
course, it would make no difference in this case, because there is identity of parties.” Id.
282. See generally Memorandum in Support of General Mills Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc. (CSX Transp. I), No. 1:14-CV-00201-TWT, 2015 WL
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This concern is not hypothetical. In CSX Transportation, Inc. v.
General Mills, Inc., a case ultimately decided on appeal to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 2017, the legal team for
General Mills—experienced attorneys from a large Minnesota firm
with the assistance of local counsel—filed a lengthy motion to
dismiss, asserting an issue preclusion defense.283 As it turns out, CSX
Transportation (the plaintiff) had already litigated the same alleged
negligence in an earlier proceeding against another party, and a jury
unambiguously resolved the issue by finding that CSX’s “sole
negligence” caused the disputed accident and resulting injuries.284
The otherwise well-written brief for General Mills thoroughly
explained how all of the elements of issue preclusion were met under
federal law, but the brief did not mention Georgia procedural law.285
Presumably, based on their cited law, corporate counsel advised their
client that they had a high likelihood of success on their motion to
dismiss. In fact, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia trial judge agreed with them and granted the motion to
dismiss.286
On appeal, however, CSX correctly argued that, although the first
lawsuit was decided in federal court, Georgia preclusion law applied
because the court sat in diversity.287 As a nonparty to the first suit,
468682 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2015), 2014 WL 11191996.
283. Id. at 12–14.
284. Id. at 14–15.
285. Id. at 12–18.
286. CSX Transp. I, 2015 WL 468682, at *5; see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc. (CSX
Transp. II), No. 1:14-CV-201-TWT, 2015 WL 12856027, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 2015) (denying
CSX’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s order granting General Mills’ motion to dismiss, but
granting CSX’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint), rev’d and remanded, 846 F.3d 1333
(11th Cir. 2017). In sum, the relevant initial procedural history of the case was as follows:
The Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, or alternatively, Motion for
Leave to File an Amended Complaint. It argued that this Court incorrectly applied
federal collateral estoppel law, and not Georgia collateral estoppel law. The Court
initially denied the Motion for Reconsideration, but granted the Motion for Leave to
File an Amended Complaint, allowing the Plaintiff to file an amended complaint
putting in issue the collateral estoppel question. However, on reconsideration, the
Court later denied the Motion to Amend the Complaint.
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc. (CSX Transp. IV), No. 1:14-CV-201-TWT, 2017 WL 4472787, at
*1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2017) (footnotes omitted).
287. Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant CSX Transportation, Inc. at 8–11, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen.
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General Mills could not satisfy strict mutuality under Georgia law
and therefore lost the appeal. 288 The success of the motion to dismiss
hinged entirely on the mutuality element. 289 In fairness to the losing
legal team, the governing precedent was not entirely clear at the
time.290 But that is precisely the point—Georgia clinging to strict
mutuality leads to avoidable appeals and mistaken assumptions about
the possible outcome of disputes.
The CSX Transportation example illustrates how congruent
procedural rules across jurisdictions would minimize the
consequences of potentially unclear and complex choice of law
doctrines.291 Federal issue preclusion law has largely remained
consistent and relatively predictable for decades.292 Changing
Georgia law to allow nonmutual defensive issue preclusion provides
the best and most practical avenue for achieving conformity and
advancing the policy of predictability in this area. By simply
adopting the federal common law elements, the Georgia Supreme
Court would eliminate these burdens on litigants and streamline the
disposition of issue preclusion defenses.293
B. How Practitioners Should Proceed
Practitioners should embrace the opportunity to challenge the
current status quo in state law by asserting nonmutual application of

Mills, Inc. (CSX Transp. III), 846 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2017) (Nos. 15-12095, 15-14399), 2016 WL
2347265, at *8–11.
288. See generally CSX Transp. III, 846 F.3d 1333.
289. Id. at 1340.
290. Id.
291. See generally id.
292. Id.; see also supra Part II.
293. Compare WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3 (listing the black letter law elements of issue
preclusion: (1) both actions involved an identical issue; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided
in the first action; (3) the parties in the first action had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; (4)
the first action was adjudicated as a valid final judgment on the merits; and (5) some form of mutuality
or limited nonmutuality, including nonmutual defensive and conditional nonmutual offensive issue
preclusion), with Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1264 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A party seeking to
assert collateral estoppel under Georgia law must demonstrate that (1) an identical issue, (2) between
identical parties, (3) was actually litigated and (4) necessarily decided, (5) on the merits, (6) in a final
judgment, (7) by a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
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issue preclusion in every possible case it could apply. Issue
preclusion is an affirmative defense that courts generally cannot raise
sua sponte.294 Therefore, trial counsel must recognize potential
preclusion defensives and raise them as early as possible. 295
Additionally, to preserve the arguments for appeal, parties should
argue for changing preclusion law in their briefs at every stage of
litigation.296
Thoroughly briefing the mutuality issue should be of paramount
importance both when petitioning the Georgia Supreme Court for
certiorari and when submitting briefs to the court after it grants
certiorari. Unless practitioners force their hand, the justices may try
to sidestep the mutuality issue and instead decide the case on other
grounds, such as privity.297
When an attorney—most likely a defense counsel—has a case ripe
for applying nonmutual defensive preclusion, the attorney should
explicitly argue for a change in law (i.e., overruling Waldroup).298
The briefs to the Georgia Supreme Court should include citations to
Blonder-Tongue and Parklane, as well as to the leading cases in other
jurisdictions and the other persuasive authorities mentioned

294. Haygood v. Head, 699 S.E.2d 588, 592 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he trial court lacked authority
to rule, sua sponte, on the merits of a collateral estoppel defense . . . . Collateral estoppel is an
affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved.” (citations omitted)). But see Insituform Techs.,
LLC v. Cosmic TopHat, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1141 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (“[W]hen the prior decision
was made by the same court, the court may apply preclusion principles sua sponte.” (citing Shurick v.
Boeing Co., 623 F.3d 1114, 1116 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010))).
295. Haygood, 699 S.E.2d at 592. The Haygood case illustrates the consequences of delay in raising
an issue preclusion defense: the defendants lost their chance to assert the defense and ultimately lost the
case. Id. (“As neither Head nor Larry Rogers raised a collateral estoppel defense prior to the time the
trial court entered its dismissal orders, the trial court should not have considered the defense.”).
296. Cf. id. The court of appeals did not consider the merits of issue preclusion because it was not
properly raised at the trial court. Id.
297. The court has often used its ever-expanding definition of privity to allow parties to prevail on
what should have been a nonmutual issue preclusion defense. See, e.g., Lilly v. Heard, 761 S.E.2d 46,
50–51 (Ga. 2014) (finding privity between two parties for the purpose of issue preclusion based solely
on the parties’ “common interest” as “residents and voters” of the same county); Parker v. Parker, 594
S.E.2d 627, 629 (Ga. 2004). Although zealous advocacy may often require attorneys to argue for privity,
they should not let a potentially winnable privity argument stop them from also urging the court to
change the mutuality doctrine.
298. Waldroup v. Greene Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 463 S.E.2d 5, 7–8 (Ga. 1995); see also supra Section
II.C.
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throughout this Note.299 Briefs to the court should also explain the
policy justifications 300—the economic arguments may carry great
weight with the justices, especially if coupled with amicus briefs
from influential groups such as the Georgia Chamber of
Commerce.301 Notably, Georgia courts have already acknowledged
the importance of similar policy goals in other cases.302
The Georgia Supreme Court recognized the modern mutuality
trends in a footnote and arguably already applied nonmutual
defensive preclusion in Nally.303 Although the facts in Nally were
particularly conducive to arguing for a change in the law, the pro se
plaintiff did not point out the mutuality requirement when defense
counsel asserted issue preclusion.304 Nevertheless, future
practitioners with more resources should cite this case and note that
the court has previously ignored the mutuality requirement to achieve
its desired ends.305
Convincing the justices to apply the modern trends as a matter of
state common law would not necessarily require changing minds but
rather just explaining the importance of this relatively obscure
299. See, e.g., supra Sections I.A–B. The Georgia Supreme Court has previously relied on U.S.
Supreme Court precedent to decide state law civil claims when the federal courts provided helpful
analysis. See, e.g., Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Comput. Servs., 538 S.E.2d
746, 748–49 (Ga. 2000).
300. See supra Section II.A.
301. See Kristal Dixon, Christian Coomer Appointed to Ga. Court of Appeals, PATCH (Sept. 15,
2018),
https://patch.com/georgia/cartersville/christian-coomer-appointed-ga-court-appeals
[https://perma.cc/3ZAS-7BZV] (noting that one judge “was appointed to the Court Reform Council by
[Governor Nathan] Deal and was named the Georgia Chamber of Commerce’s Legislator of the Year in
2017”).
302. See, e.g., Stott v. Mody, 572 S.E.2d 83, 86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming a summary judgment
of preclusion based on finding of privity). In Stott, the Georgia Court of Appeals held:
The fact that they lack a remedy . . . does not require this court to disregard
established legal principles and allow them to relitigate the very issue already
adjudicated . . . . This would be tantamount to creating “a framework under which a
plaintiff could consciously design a legal strategy which would allow him two shots
at the same target.”
Id. (quoting McNeal v. Paine, Weber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 293 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Ga. 1982)). These
very same arguments also apply to permitting nonmutual defensive issue preclusion.
303. See supra Section II.C; see also Nally v. Bartow Cnty. Grand Jurors, 633 S.E.2d 337, 339–40
(Ga. 2006).
304. See Nally, 633 S.E.2d at 338–39.
305. See supra Section II.C.
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doctrinal reform.306 In a 2020 case, the Georgia Supreme Court
opined that “[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel must be applied with
‘realism and rationality’ and not in a ‘hypertechnical and archaic’
manner.”307 Practitioners should cite this sentence and argue that
strict mutuality is perhaps the most “archaic” and least “rational”
aspect of Georgia’s current collateral estoppel jurisprudence. 308
Although that case did not ultimately center on civil procedure, the
court did rely heavily on U.S. Supreme Court decisions, which it
could (and should) do again when changing issue preclusion law to
conform with federal standards.309
In fact, the Georgia Supreme Court has approvingly cited decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court when deciding other issue preclusion
cases.310 In Gwinnett County Board of Tax Assessors v. General
Electric Capital Computer Services, the Georgia Supreme Court
ruled on the applicability of issue preclusion in certain tax cases.311
The court commented that “[t]he Supreme Court of the United States
has addressed the role of collateral estoppel in a tax dispute,” and
then devoted the next two paragraphs of its opinion to reviewing the
relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases and their holdings.312
The justices have also looked to the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments for guidance when clarifying other elements of issue
preclusion.313 In Kent v. Kent, the appellant’s resourceful counsel
pointed out the ambiguities of the “essential to the judgment”
element of issue preclusion in appellate court precedent. 314 In its
306. See supra Section II.C.
307. Medina v. State, 844 S.E.2d 767, 773 (Ga. 2020) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444
(1970)).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Comput. Servs., 538 S.E.2d
746, 748 (Ga. 2000).
311. Id. at 746–47.
312. Id. at 748–49.
313. See, e.g., Kent v. Kent, 452 S.E.2d 764, 766 n.2 (Ga. 1995).
314. Id. (“The wife argues the second element, that the determination be essential to the judgment, is
unnecessary. A number of cases from our court and the Court of Appeals state that collateral estoppel
(or ‘estoppel by judgment’) applies to matters ‘necessarily or actually decided.’ . . . However, the
question of whether the previously litigated issue was or was not essential to the earlier judgment did
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analysis, the Georgia Supreme Court cited the Restatement and
concluded, “[t]he correct rule, followed in some of our appellate
decisions, . . . is that followed by the Restatement.”315 Of course, this
same Restatement also endorses nonmutual defensive issue
preclusion.316
Importantly, however, persuasive authority from other
jurisdictions has not always carried the day for the Georgia Supreme
Court justices.317 In Shields v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing
Corp., the parties did not contest the mutuality element; rather, the
appellant tried to persuade the court that issue preclusion should not
apply to unemployment compensation decisions. 318 The appellant’s
brief heavily cited the Restatement, federal court decisions, and
decisions from more than ten other states’ highest courts.319 All of
those sources supported the appellant’s public policy arguments. 320
Despite this apparent national consensus, the court ruled against the
appellant.321 And despite the appellant’s lengthy brief detailing the
viewpoints of other courts and legal scholars, 322 the court’s opinion
exclusively cited Georgia cases and did not address the public policy
arguments.323 This deviation from national consensus, however,
not seem to be disputed in those cases.” (citations omitted)). Practitioners should cite this passage and
point out that most of the litigants in the court’s earlier decisions similarly did not dispute the issue of
whether mutuality applies. See id. (collecting cases where the issue of mutuality was not in dispute).
315. Id. (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. L. INST.
1982).
316. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. L. INST. 1982) (“A party who has had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate an issue has been accorded the elements of due process. In the absence of
circumstances suggesting the appropriateness of allowing him to relitigate the issue, there is no good
reason for refusing to treat the issue as settled so far as he is concerned other than that of making the
burden of litigation risk and expense symmetrical between him and his adversaries.”); see also
Hoffheimer, supra note 6, at 544 (“The Restatement (Second) of Judgments largely codifies the Supreme
Court’s approach in Parklane Hosiery.”).
317. See, e.g., Shields v. Bellsouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 545 S.E.2d 898, 898–99 (Ga. 2001).
318. Brief of Appellant Paul Shields at 3, 16, Shields, 545 S.E.2d 898 (No. 99-8307-HH), 2000 WL
34252049, at *3, *16. The Appellant argued that unemployment compensation proceedings do not
provide a claimant a full and fair opportunity to litigate all issues related to his discharge. Id. at 3, 24–
30.
319. Id. at 9–28.
320. Id.
321. Shields, 545 S.E.2d at 898–99.
322. See Brief of Appellant Paul Shields, supra note 318, at 9–28.
323. Shields, 545 S.E.2d at 900–01.
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should not necessarily alarm proponents of nonmutual issue
preclusion because the underlying policy goals implicitly advanced
by the court’s holding—broadening the scope of issue preclusion—
are consistent with those of nonmutuality.324 Regardless, the primary
takeaway from the Shields case is that practitioners should not rely
exclusively on persuasive authority from other jurisdictions,
regardless of its breadth. Instead, appellate briefs should also include
citations to prior Georgia case law such as Wickliffe and the line of
appellate cases that began to abrogate mutuality before being
overturned.325
C. The Legislative Alternative
Should the Georgia Supreme Court continue to resist changing the
traditional mutuality doctrine, the Georgia General Assembly can
codify nonmutual defensive preclusion in a statute. Indeed, some
courts have relied on existing statutory authority when applying other
elements of preclusion law.326 The legislature could either amend that
statute or enact a new one.
The legislature already expressed its preference for conformity
with federal law in this area when it modeled the Georgia Civil
Practice Act after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.327 In fact, the
legislature continues to update Georgia civil procedure statutes to
324. See generally id. (applying issue preclusion to unemployment compensation decisions). The
Shields rule broadens the scope of issue preclusion, and nonmutuality similarly increases the categories
of litigants allowed to assert an issue preclusion defense. Id.
325. See, e.g., Wickliffe I, 489 S.E.2d 153, 155–56 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, No. S97C1859,
1998 Ga. LEXIS 185 (Ga. Jan. 5, 1998).
326. See, e.g., Morrison v. Morrison, 663 S.E.2d 714, 719 (Ga. 2008) (Benham, J., dissenting)
(finding that Georgia Code section 9-12-40 “codifies the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel”); O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 (2015 & Supp. 2020) (“A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which
under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered
until the judgment is reversed or set aside.”).
327. See, e.g., Ashley Harris et al., Civil Practice Act: Allow for Discretionary Appeal of Class
Certification; Adopt Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 Pertaining to Class Actions; Amend Interest
Amount on Judgments; Prohibit Third Voluntary Dismissal by Plaintiff; Permit Courts to Use
Discretion in Declining Jurisdiction When Another Forum Is More Convenient; Change the
Pre-Judgment Interest Rate; Provide for Vacation of an Arbitration Award Based Upon an Arbitrator’s
Manifest Disregard for the Law, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 28, 36 (2003).
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match the federal standards.328 These changes greatly simplify state
court litigation for attorneys already familiar with the federal rules,
which all law school students learn as part of the mandatory first-year
curriculum. Although nonmutual issue preclusion is not codified in
the federal rules, nothing prevents Georgia from amending the Civil
Practice Act to further mirror established federal jurisprudence.
The Georgia legislature has not been shy in superseding common
law.329 The legislators passed a tort reform measure in 2005 and may
take up the issue again in future sessions.330 Although perhaps less
politically salient, issue preclusion reform—specifically, allowing
nonmutual defensive preclusion—serves many of the same ends as
tort reform with much less controversy or potential inequity.331
CONCLUSION
Simply stated, when it comes to plaintiffs litigating an issue, the
standard should be “one bite, everybody knows the rules.”332
Georgia’s current precedent allows plaintiffs to have multiple “bites,”
and no one seems to know the rules. 333

328. See id.
329. Dave Williams, Georgia Republicans Likely to Renew Push for Tort Reform, ATLANTA BUS.
CHRON. (Sept. 6, 2019, 5:45 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2019/09/06/georgiarepublicans-likely-to-renew-push-fortort.html [https://perma.cc/W6GE-5SRK].
330. Rachel Tobin Ramos, Tort Reform Bill Passes General Assembly, Heads to Perdue, ATLANTA
BUS.
CHRON.,
https://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2005/02/14/daily9.html
[https://perma.cc/G96A-3BBB] (Feb. 14, 2005, 5:10 PM). The Act capped noneconomic damages for
medical malpractice claims at $350,000. Id. In 2010, the Georgia Supreme Court found that cap to be
unconstitutional. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 220 (Ga. 2010); see
also Nigel Wright et al., Tort Reform Unraveled – Georgia Supreme Court Finds Non-Economic
Damages
Caps
to
Be
Unconstitutional,
LEXOLOGY
(Mar.
26,
2010),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=caf6cf52-5718-4c29-aa3a-c61518ec73f5
[https://perma.cc/77DP-M3FB]. Legislators have since “renewed their push for tort reform in a big
way.” Dave Williams, Tort Reform Push Cranks Up in General Assembly, SAVANNAH NOW (Mar. 1,
2020, 12:19 PM), https://www.savannahnow.com/news/20200301/tort-reform-push-cranks-up-ingeneral-assembly [https://perma.cc/NZK4-ZJPS].
331. Compare sources cited supra note 330, with discussion supra Section II.A
332. Cf. Barstool Sports, One Bite with Davey Pageviews – Kiss My Slice with Special Guest Johnny
Bananas, YOUTUBE (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcENFGaz4VI (using the
phrase “one bite, everybody knows the rules”).
333. See supra Sections I.A.2, I.C, II.D, II.E, III.A.3.
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In light of the overwhelming national trends and the policy
considerations discussed throughout this Note, Georgia should
confront the mutuality issue and allow litigants to assert issue
preclusion defensively even if they lack mutuality. States began
rethinking mutuality decades ago, and federal courts continue to
follow the Blonder-Tongue rule.334 Georgia should not continue to
lag behind other states in this area of law by following an antiquated
procedural rule of mutuality. Allowing nonmutual defensive issue
preclusion would benefit the court system, litigants, and business
interests. The time is now for the Georgia Supreme Court, or perhaps
the legislature, to bring the state’s issue preclusion law into the
twenty-first century.

334. See cases cited supra note 50.
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